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Abstract
In this article, the author argues that antitrust law has entered a new phase of its controversial
existence. The role of antitrust in moderating inter-firm relationships depends both on the
problems of the underlying market regime and the institutional capacity of antitrust decisionmakers to respond to those challenges. For much of the 20th century, the model firm was
hierarchical: vertical integration within the business organization was a way of achieving
transaction cost efficiencies and delivering higher levels of output at lower prices. Recognition of
this fact transformed antitrust from its traditional focus on concentrated power, to a policy
focused on economic efficiency. This new emphasis necessarily led to a more modest antitrust
policy, since courts were not institutionally well-suited to promoting efficiency. However, in the
past two decades the model firm itself has also been transformed both by changes in technology
and due to greater volatility of market conditions. Production is increasingly decentralized, and
characterized by a profusion of deeply collaborative relationships, with innovation as a key
aspect of firm success. This article brings together the emerging literature that describes the
changes in firm organization, the governance problems of the new forms of joint development
and the antitrust responses to those changes. The author argues that antitrust can play an
important role in governing collaborative production relationships and identifies the institutional
and remedial mechanisms of the new antitrust policy.
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I. Introduction
Much maligned and more modest than in its recent heyday, antitrust law is yet
again said to be in search for an equilibrium,1 to adjust the goals and instruments of
antitrust intervention to changes in the market environment. The paradox of this field of
law is evident — antitrust tries to save the market mechanism from itself — which means
that it has no strong friends either among free-marketeers or interventionists. If we asked
hypothetically: “What would happen if the antitrust laws were no longer enforced?”, the
response of our collocutor is likely to be rather muted.2 With other areas of regulation
(such as environmental or labor law) the policy trade-offs are, at least conceptually, much
clearer and more apparent.3 Not so with antitrust. In a world of increasingly open
markets marked by intense global competition, and a legal universe of targeted legislative
interventions that correct for specific market failures, it is legitimate to ask whether there
remains even a residual role for antitrust law. From such a skeptical point of view,
antitrust is nothing more than an obstacle to hard-nosed competition or beneficial firm
collaboration and integration, or an anachronistic legal-regulatory nuisance. With a more
sinister twist, antitrust can be seen as an extraordinary tool that can be abused by less
efficient or opportunistic competitors and plaintiff-bar attorneys to disrupt successful
firms and claim a share of their revenues.
In the early stages of an always controversial existence, antitrust law was
assimilated to the field of business crime and misfeasance. Given the progressivist
concerns at the time of the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, about the
accumulation of economic and political power in the trusts, as well as the practices for
buttressing such power that included bid-rigging and cartelization, the standard tools of
antitrust intervention were based on law enforcement.4 In deciding antitrust cases,
1
Cf. Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 75
CAL. L. REV. 959, 959 (1987) ("My theme is the narrower one of, to borrow a phrase, the law in search of
itself."); Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140
(1981) (hereinafter "Fox, Modernization").
2
The academic literature has attempted to engage in more precise speculation on this question.
Compare, Robert W. Crandall and Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare?
Assessing the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 23-24 (2003) (arguing that the evidence of the net
benefits of antitrust enforcement is weak and that this justifies only minimal interventions in the most
egregious cases), with Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
27, 42 (2003) (arguing that the benefits of antitrust intervention far outweigh the costs of enforcement
while emphasizing the point that the quantitative calculus is speculative).
3
See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down and Sideways, 75
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1781, 1790-91 (2000).
4
Antitrust law was put in place in the U.S. long before the tools of the modern regulatory state
emerged during the New Deal.
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generalist courts aimed to elaborate clear rules that would isolate species of prohibited
business conduct and thereby provide a guide for business compliance. Such rules, when
combined with government enforcement and the availability of treble damages in private
suits, would also have a powerful deterrent effect for firms not to engage in
anticompetitive conduct. Despite changes in the focus of antitrust policy and substantial
evolution in antitrust doctrine in over a century,5 the basic institutional and remedial
forms for implementing antitrust through the courts have remained unchanged.
Over time, a number of intractable problems emerged with the standard
enforcement approach. First, efficient deterrence requires the elaboration of rules that
isolate anti-competitive from innocent conduct. Yet such delineation has proved
impossible, in part due to recognition that the competitive significance of most business
conduct subjected to antitrust scrutiny is ex ante ambiguous, irrespective of how the goals
of antitrust policy are defined.6 As a result, antitrust doctrinal rules have been either
under-inclusive, or over-inclusive, or worse, conclusory labels that approve or condemn
particular conduct, but lack substantive content which might guide future compliance.7
Second, given limits in their capacity to analyze conduct on a case-by- case basis and to
formulate effective remedies to correct for violations, courts have increasingly tended to
shrink the field of antitrust intervention. Finally, because of the difficulties associated
with formulation and supervision of effective non-damage remedies, courts prefer to rely
on damages awards in antitrust cases.8 Yet treble damage awards often do not fully
correct the identified problem. An additional concern is that, in the context of a murky
doctrine, damages may encourage opportunistic misuse of antitrust litigation against
successful firms. Therefore, it is no surprise that assimilation to the field of business
crime has resulted in a restrained antitrust law that most actively polices only conduct
that closely resembles criminal offenses — namely, clandestine price-fixing conspiracies.
A few stylized facts set the background for this article. First, since it achieved
dominance in the academy and the courts over two decades ago, the Chicago School
dramatically reshaped antitrust law, shifting its concern away from fairness and the
5

State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (O'Connor, J.) (antitrust law has "recogniz[ed] and adapt[ed]
to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience").
6
Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive
Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371 (2002) (commenting on the elusive notion of anticompetitive effects of
conduct under the antitrust laws).
7
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV 253 (2003).
8
American antitrust lawyers do not view themselves as regulators. The ideal antitrust remedy is a
one-off intervention that releases the forces of competition as the main discipline on firms, and thereby
helps to avoid the heavy hand of regulation. See Robert H. Lande, Professor Waller's Un-American
Approach to Antitrust, 32 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 137, 142-144 (2000); Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing
Globalism Home: Lessons from Antitrust and Beyond, 32 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 113 (2000).
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politics of concentrated economic power, to an overarching concern with economic
efficiency. Given that firm size and integration are not necessarily inimical to efficiency,
and that courts are not institutionally well suited to promote efficiency, the new paradigm
advocated, and produced, a minimalist antitrust policy.9 In such a context, for a scholarly
effort to propose a more ambitious antitrust policy, it must either provide a better set of
efficiency-based doctrinal rules, or suggest ways to relax the institutional and remedial
constraints on decision-making, or some combination of the two.10
Second, in that same period, a fundamental transformation has taken place in the
model firm itself: from a top-down vertically integrated organization towards looser
networks of collaboration.11 Rather than emphasizing integration as a way of achieving
efficiencies within the firm, the new organization relies on inter-firm collaboration, as a
way of managing uncertainty and developing innovative products in an unstable market
environment. Antitrust law has only begun to respond to these changes in the very nature
of markets. This article describes these developments and proposes a framework for
assessing the doctrinal and institutional reactions to the new economy. The key claim is
that, antitrust can play an important role in overcoming governance problems of interfirm collaboration that create bottlenecks in innovation. However, such a role requires an
institutional shift away from the traditional deterrence model, a shift which is already
under way.
To make this claim, the article demonstrates the institutional strains on
enforcement that emerge during the efficiency stage in antitrust, inspired by the Chicago
School and the old model of the firm. Oncethe rule-based approach was abandoned,
rather than incorporating fact-specific evidence or economic knowledge in antitrust
decision-making, the courts responded through doctrinal and procedural short-cuts to
effectively avoid becoming embroiled in antitrust disputes. The institutional strains were
exacerbated as novel technologies and different kinds of strategic interaction in more
dynamic contexts made the efficiency calculus more complex.12 In the new production
9

On the Chicago view, there is no logical reason if a court does not understand a particular practice,
to outlaw it. Ronald H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in 3 POLICY ISSUES AND
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 59, 67 (V. Fuchs ed. 1972); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1984).
10
See, e.g., William E. K ovacic, Achieving better practices in the design of competition policy
institutions, 50 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 511 (2005); William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments:
Using Ex Post Assessments of Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 843 (2001).
11
See, generally, John Roberts, THE MODERN FIRM, (2004) (hereinafter "Roberts, Modern Firm");
Charles F. Sabel, Real Time Revolution in Routines, in THE CORPORATION AS A COLLABORATIVE
COMMUNITY, 106 (C. Hecksher & P. Adler eds., 2005) (hereinafter "Sabel, Real Time Revolution").
12
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 939(2001) .
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environment, innovation is key to success, and on-going collaboration and joint
development are key to innovation. The article maps out the governance problems that
arise out of collaborative production relationships, and the new challenges they pose not
only for antitrust, but also for the forms of contractual relationships among firms and the
role of the intellectual property regime. In the absence of guidance from doctrine,
antitrust courts and agencies have steered away from imposing antitrust liability on
antitrust defendants, relying instead on the design of novel remedial forms.13 Such
remedies are sensitive to the complexities of the underlying problems and, rather than
being court-centric, seek to involve a broader set of actors in the resolution of those
problems.§14 To the extent that these novel remedial formsprovide an effective antitrust
reponse to the problem of governing collaborations, I argue that they supply the
constructs of the new form of competition policy.

II. The elaboration of antitrust doctrines
The antitrust doctrinal rules that courts continue to invoke emerged as the result
of judicial efforts to balance the general terms of the statutory language with the public's
changing attitudes towards the benefits of competition and its suspicion of business
conduct, as well as changes in industry relationships and forms of production. The
doctrinal framework has also been greatly influenced by legal policy factors, including
the limits of the judicial capacity to engage in economic regulation within the confines of
the common law method. The legal tools of antitrust analysis are based on a 19th century
statute and the subsequent century of doctrinal elaboration, consistently invoked in
antitrust cases since the middle of the 20th century, both struggling to comprehend the
new complexities of market interaction and organization of production.
While opting for a statutory entrenchment of the antitrust laws, Congress left both
the text and the goals of the statutory provisions considerably vague. Therefore, in
deciding antitrust cases the courts have to do more than just implement the law –
effectively, they have developed competition policy with little textual or contextual
guidance. Atits inception, the Sherman Act was m otivated by a set of concerns about
concentrations of power in the hands of large economic conglomerates (or trusts), but the
statutory standards were left vague because the goals of the legislation were largely
13

Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: The Matter of Remedies, 91
GEO. L.J. 169 (2002) (emphasizing the importance of novel remedial forms).
14
Cf. Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1017-18 (2004) (observing similar trends in other areas of public law).
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inchoate.15 Both the scope and the application of federal antitrust law developed from the
experience and learning that emerged from resolving actual antitrust controversies.
The decision to assign antitrust policy to the generalist courts has had two
important consequences. First, relying on legal doctrine as the main vehicle for policy
elaboration allowed the goals of antitrust policy to remain vague, since legal doctrine
looks to the past for guidance and should not, at least in theory, be focused instrumentally
on outcomes. Thus, antitrust law could develop largely unhinged from any elaboration of
the goals of antitrust policy, or how particular antitrust interventions could contribute
towards achieving those goals.
Second, the elasticity of statutory language gave the courts flexibility to adjust
legal doctrine to changing circumstances and experience. However, this left antitrust law
only with a long-term ability for learning and self-correction. Legal doctrine is inherently
path-dependent and the courts are not institutionally well-suited to monitoring and
evaluating their own decisions, given the traditional judicial remedies and the particular
preference for one-off remedies in antitrust cases. The law enforcement paradigm makes
it difficult to monitor the effectiveness of individual interventions and remedies,16 and as
a result, the opportunity to correct errors was likely to come too late and only after a
backlash.

A. The Warren Court and the makings of a backlash
In the post-War period,17 antitrust became an active area of government
enforcement and judicial activity. The progressivist suspicions towards concentrated
economic power and its effects on democratic politics of an earlier era were reinforced by
the role played by industrial monopolies and cartels in buttressing totalitarian regimes in
Germany and Japan before and during the War.18 Such a view guided government policy
15

Judge Leval has used the Sherman Act as the paradigmatic example of a delegating statute
implementing a new policy in very imprecise terms to be elaborated by the common law method. Pierre N.
Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J. L. & THE ARTS 187, 197 (2003).
16
Waller Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND.
L. J. 1, 31 (1951) (“[T]he government has … won many a case, but lost many a cause”.).
17
Earlier attitudes towards antitrust were far more ambivalent. During the Great Depression, there
was growing suspicion towards the deflationary effects of ruinous competition and against active antitrust
enforcement. ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 8691(1995) (describing the shifting attitudes to the antitrust laws and to competition more generally by the
late 1930s).
18
DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING
PROMETHEUS 147-48 (1998) (the German Nazi government overturned the cartel regulation, required the
formation of cartels and sought to integrate them into the state apparatus). See also GARY HERRIGEL,
INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTIONS: THE SOURCES OF GERMAN INDUSTRIAL POWER 139-40 (1996).
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more broadly, and the U.S. promoted an active antitrust policy, both at home and abroad,
as a democracy-enforcing tool.19 Chastened by earlier judicial forays into economic
regulation20 and in an environment of deference to the other arms of government, the
Court endorsed a view of antitrust as a procedural tool thatguarantee s the vibrancy of the
competitive process so as to ensure opportunity, representation and democratic control
over economic agglomerations.21
The economic effects of antitrust intervention were not at center stage, and to the
extent such effects were relevant to antitrust decisions, early antitrust economics was
supportive of an interventionist competition policy. The structure-conduct-performance
paradigm, current in the then nascent field of industrial economics, suggested the
existence of a direct and causal relationship between a concentrated market structure,
exclusionary firm conduct and poor market effects.22 Low market concentration, and the
absence of restraints on the atomistic conduct of small (price-taking) firms were thought
to be conducive to superior market performance and beneficial for consumers. If
consumer welfare was one part of the antitrust calculus, it was certainly not the sole or
even the determinative criterion. An active antitrust enforcement aimed to ensure that
markets were open in order to protect the economic opportunities of smaller producers to
compete on the merits, without being foreclosed by larger, established enterprises. This
is another way in which the progressive flavor of the Court's antitrust jurisprudence was
consistent with its focus on the emancipation of individual rights and opportunities and
its view of the proper judicial role in a democracy.
Given those views, the Warren Court rapidly expanded the category of
prohibitions on conduct and inter-firm restraints declared per se illegal, at a high level of
generality and across different markets. The Court was particularly sensitive to the
difficulties associated with a full-fledged analysis of the market effects of particular
contractual restraints, or conduct, or mergers under the rule of reason. Instead, the courts
relied on retrospective identification and characterization of conduct and on proxies, such
as evidence of the firm's anticompetitive intent. If they lacked understanding about
19

Harry First, Antitrust in Japan: The Original Intent, 9P AC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (2000).
By 1937 the Supreme Court pulled back from any constitutional economic supervision of
Congressional legislation and yet in subsequent years courts began to reassert their authority, not only in
areas such as racial discrimination, civil liberties, but also in new forms of economic regulation where
common law institutions were seen to be well-adapted to the post-New Deal context. See John F. Witt, The
King and the Dean, unpublished manuscript (46-47) (on file with the author).
21
See, e.g., JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981); Gary Minda, Antitrust at Century's End,
48 S.M.U.L. REV. 1749, 1763-65 (1995).
22
See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956) (viewed as the progenitor of the structure-conduct-performance
paradigm).
20
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certain apparently restrictive conduct, courts tended towards outlawing it with very
sweeping statements.23 By contrast, for conduct which was found not to fall within a per
se prohibition, the courts were reluctant to undertake a complete inquiry into both the
reasons and likely effects of the impugned business practice, so that rule of reason
analysis amounted to de facto legality.24
The Warren Court was not necessarily hostile towards claims of productive and
other efficiencies that might result from different forms of integration or collaboration.25
However, the doctrine limited judges and juries to enforcing a set of procedural rules of
the game, rather than becoming involved in substantive evaluation and weighing of
efficiency claims, or assessment of how speculative efficiency gains would be
distributed. Such an approach was orthodox, since ex post balancing is not a good ex ante
guide for firm compliance. Judicial modesty combined with judicial ignorance lead to
judicial over-reaching, but the doctrine was consistent with prevailing social attitudes and
the dominant view in industry economics. Often in the same breath, the courts professed
ignorance about competitive dynamics, but denied themselves the opportunity to
overcome this:
The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining
difficult economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in any
meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector
of the economy against promotion of competition in
another sector is one important reason we have formulated
per se rules.
In applying these rigid rules, the Court has
consistently rejected the notion that naked restraints of
trade are to be tolerated because they are well intended or
because they are allegedly developed to increase
competition.26
To foregoing approach led to a substantial broadening of the category of per se
prohibitions and this led to the ultimate backlash against antitrust intervention for two
reasons. First, the restrictive doctrine imposed serious limits on inter-firm contracting
23

See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co. v United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977).
25
Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade
Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 211-12 (2005) (referring to merger cases where the Court refused to
consider efficiencies as a defense). Even the firms proposing a merger in most cases cannot evaluate the
likelihood of efficiencies, thus the significant number of failed mergers. See Oliver Budzinski, Towards an
International Governance of Transborder Mergers? Competition Networks and Institutions Between
Centralism and Decentralism, 36 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 13 (2004).
26
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
24
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practices and collaboration, which would not produce harm, except forinefficient
competitors or opportunistic downstream firms. Second, the bias in favor of per se
treatment, the reliance on proxy evidence of anticompetitive intent (including easily
discoverable general statements by management of plans to squash or destroy
competition) and the availability of treble damages in private suits encouraged
opportunistic use of the antitrust laws as a tool for market manipulation. The antitrust
regime was not a particularly precise or effectivetool of re -distribution, since it could be
misused to protect the inefficiencies and profits of market rivals under the guise of
protecting competition. Firms did not even have to spend resources to lobby or capture
the enforcement agencies as a regulatory screening mechanism, since they could present
their arguments directly to receptive courts and juries.

B. The Chicago New Learning
The Chicago School re-examination of antitrust doctrine took place in a context of
broader disenchantment about the ability of government and bureaucracy to solve
pressing social and economic problems.27 During and after the 1970s, public policy
debates increasingly focused on the issue of the world competitiveness of American
industry, and the antitrust regime was scrutinized for its effects on the ability of
American firms to compete with foreign products. The U.S. had cast itself in the role of
the world's antitrust policeman,28 and yet U.S. firms found it difficult to withstand foreign
competition even in U.S. markets. American firms have attempted to use domestic
antitrust to fend off competition from Japanese firms,29 and even to pry open Japanese
markets for American firms.30 Irrespective of the underlying causes of differences in
competitiveness, it was important for rhetorical purposes that Japanese antitrust
enforcement was substantially more lax and yet, Japanese firms could deliver products to
consumers at a better quality and price. This strengthened the perception that once U.S.
firms were subjected to the rigors of foreign competition, U.S. antitrust policy could no
longer afford to promote its non-efficiency civic goals.31
Chicago scholars proposed to make both the goals and the instruments of antitrust
policy more pragmatic and accountable, drawing on economic explanations of the firm
27

See Michael C. Dorf, After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1254 (2004).
See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); United States v. Nippon Paper
Industries Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
29
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
30
Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AMER. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1997).
31
Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down and Sideways, 75
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1781, 1798 (2000).
28
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and market interaction.32 The opening claim of Chicago scholarship was that antitrust
policy could be made both coherent and accountable, by clarifying and limiting its goals
to enhancing economic efficiency (or consumer welfare), so that the maximum level of
output was produced at the lowest price.33 While market structure could affect other
policy goals—distributional, political, civic or environmental—these made antitrust
analysis too complex, and reduced the accountability of antitrust interventions.34 Such
goals could be assigned to other, more appropriately targeted policies. In an antitrust
policy focused on efficiency, mere reliance on structural variables (such as firm size and
market concentration) was a poor guide for antitrust decision-making. Chicago scholars
were particularly critical of the courts' unwillingness to hear possible legitimate
justification for certain kinds of conduct or contractual restraints. Finally, picking up on
the courts' lack of confidence in their own ability to analyze and control anti-competitive
conduct, Chicago scholars pointed out that, quite apart from legal rules, firm conduct is
subject to market discipline from existing or new rivals.
The Chicago New Learning was not a program for an ambitious antitrust policy to
promote economic efficiency. The main aim of the Chicago project was to curtail the
growth of the per se prohibitions by emphasizing efficiency justifications for some of the
contracting practices already condemned by the Court. Importantly Chicago scholars
accepted and worked within the institutional constraints inherent in antitrust enforcement
through the generalist courts. In describing the limits of antitrust, Chicago scholars were
relying (unsurprisingly) on the limits of law, but also (perhaps more surprisingly) on the
limits of economics, because, as Easterbrook explained (i) economic analysis may have
limited predictive powers; (ii) economists may only be able to fully explain the reasons
for, and effects of, particular conduct only retrospectively and with the benefit of
hindsight; and (iii) the judicialtask of weighing anticompetitive against procompetitive
effects and efficiencies may be either difficult or impossible at the time of a court's
decision.35
In light of those limitations, Chicago scholars assert the conviction that unfettered
markets should be treated as presumptively efficient, or at least that market outcomes are
32

See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978) (this
was the seminal book that became the manifesto of antitrust (non)enforcement during the Reagan
Administration).
33
Fox, Modernization at 1144-45.
34
The foundations for this shift away from the “civic” and towards the “consumerist” grounds for
antitrust had been laid much earlier, with Thurman Arnold's appointment as the head of the antitrust
division of the Department of Justice in 1938. Brinkley, supra n.XX at 91. See also Michael J. Sandel,
Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, 85 GEO. L. J. 2073, 2077-79 (1997).
35
Easterbrook, supra n.XX at 2-3, 39-40.
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less likely to be detrimental than government interventions. In the absence of clearly
demonstrated restrictive effects on output leading to higher consumer prices, an antitrust
intervention is not justified, since false positives of government intervention are likely to
be more harmful than false negatives.36

C. Responses to Chicago
The New Learning had a profound impact on antitrust doctrine and the level of
antitrust litigation in the U.S. because it was consistent with a growing understanding of
the different role of the firm in production. Courts were receptive to the Chicago
prescriptions because they involved minimal adjustments to the standard approach of
deciding antitrust cases.37 Accepting that courts have a limited capacity to engage in
antitrust decision-making, the Chicago school did not advocate for a policy of learning.
Instead Chicago scholars took the ignorance of the antitrust institutions, at least on the
issue of efficiency, as a given and proposed a simple switch in presumptions: the default
antitrust rule was to treat the conduct as legal and defer to business decisions. The
antitrust plaintiff has a high burden to show how conduct would enhance the defendant
firm's market power to exploit consumers, and that this would not be corrected by
existing or new entrants, assuming that the courts hear the plaintiff's explanation (in the
same way that the courts previously invoked the per se rule in order to preclude
explanations proffered by antitrust defendants).
The academic response to the Chicago New Learning in favor of a more robust
antitrust policy has developed in two broad directions, both of which have had a limited
impact on doctrine. Antitrust lawyers steeped in the earlier tradition, accept that in some
cases the old antitrust doctrine was consistent with the Chicago insights, and in those
cases economic arguments could guide antitrust decision-making.38 However, they also
insist that courts must accommodate the economicconsiderations with in the established
doctrine. A rule-based approach to antitrust adjudication has the additional benefit of a
reasonably settled state of the law, providing greater certainty for business actors. A
more freewheeling (case by case) inquiry into the effects of conduct or mergers is

36

Eleanor M. Fox, Consumers Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1714, 1719-20 (1986) (book
review) (arguing that Chicago antitrust involves not only a methodological shift, but is underpinned by a
particular social and political philosophy). See also Gabrielle Meagher and Shaun Wilson, Complexity and
Practical Knowledge in the Social Sciences, 53 BRIT. J. OF SOC. 639, 662 (2002).
37
See, e.g, Continental T.V., Inc. v GTE Sylvania Inc.. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (exempting from per se
treatment vertical non-price restraints used to control free-riding).
38
Fox, Modernization at 1180-81.

ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE

11

regulatory and would increase the ex ante uncertainty about the legality of business
conduct.
On this view, the Chicago School reformulation of the goals of antitrust was also
fundamentally illegitimate. The early antitrust rules were sensitive to the broader
political and social context in which competition law operates, and promoted civic
objectives.39 Quite apart from the democracy-enforcing paradigm, the Warren Court
antitrust has been described as “humanistic,” and consistent with the promotion of the
rights and the economic empowerment of systemically disadvantaged groups championed
in its constitutional and civil rights jurisprudence.40 As EleanorFox points out, a
competition law regime that does not focus merely on market outcomes (such as
consumer prices), but also maintains an open market architecture, protects the
competitive process and the opportunities fornew or smaller firms to bring their product
to market and compete on the merits, is not necessarily detrimental to consumer welfare
either. This is provided that antitrust enforcement does not illegitimately shield inefficient
competitors.41
These and similar arguments, however, have not provided a basis for an antitrust
resurgence, largely because they do not provide an institutional framework through which
these broader considerations can be incorporated in antitrust analysis, without courts
slipping into the excesses of the earlier era. In particular, it is not clearhow a court can
implement all those strictures and balance the various potentially legitimate
considerations within the confines of an antitrust case. The old antitrust rules were overinclusive and path dependent because in an adjudicative context antitrust cases presented
a zero sum game (whereby conduct is declared legal or illegal),judicialreasoning is
backward looking and yet it has a precedential effect in other market settings. A court
simply cannot regulate the competitive process, which is on-going, through one-off
interventions adjudicating upon a particular practice. Once the need to gobeyond broad
and over-inclusive rules of prohibition is accepted, antitrust decision-making must
balance context specific considerations. Even if scholars are willing to entrust this
function to the courts,42 the courts are apparently not willing to accept it. For similar
39

Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051 (1979); Philip
Areeda, Always a Borrower: Law and Other Disciplines, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1029, 1040 (hereinafter "Areeda,
Always a Borrower").
40
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N.Y.U.L. REV. 1781, 1798 (2000), Fox, Modernization at 1151-52.
41
See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors, 26 WORLD
COMPETITION 149, 162 (2003).
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reasons, it is not helpful to insist that antitrust has traditionally embodied values other
than economic efficiency, unless those values can be translated into rules that guide
judicial decision-making in particular cases.43
The second line of research has been spurred by post-Chicago developments in
the economics of industrial organization, with the growth of theoretical and empirical
work that models competitive market interactions. Improved understanding of the
connection between observed structural and behavioral market variablesto future market
outcomes could identify situations in which anticompetitive problems are likely to arise.
Post-Chicago antitrust accepts that the objective of a coherent and accountable
competition policy is to enhance economic efficiency. However, it also has greater faith
in the assistance that economists can offer antitrust decision-making in predicting the
likelihood of consumer price effects of given conduct in particular markets instead of
relying on the (unverified) claim that market forces are self-correcting and thus erode
entrenchments and abuses of market power, or at the very least do so faster than antitrust
intervention.44
Antitrust doctrine in the U.S. is capable of incorporating the insights of modern
industrial economics in at least two ways. The first route is to rely on more sophisticated
economic models in order to develop more nuanced ex ante rules describing conduct that
would raise competition concerns.45 Such rules could come either in the form of per se
prohibitions of unambiguously pernicious conduct or more general standards which,
applied to particular contexts and cases, could help judges distinguish legitimate
competition from anticompetitive conduct. The alternative route is for the court to rely
upon economic expert evidence in order to determine, on a case-by- case basis, whether
the specific conduct is likely to harm consumers.46 Of course, these two methods of
economic input into antitrust decision-making are not mutually exclusive. Admission of
Between Competitors, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 82, 112 (Thomas M. Jorde and
David J. Teece eds., 1992).
43
For example, the argument that a more activist antitrust policy promotes democratic values by
supporting the opportunities for self-sufficiency of smaller traders and by reducing the concentration of
economic power, to ensure democratic control over corporations, does not supply a set of coherent
principles which can provide concrete guidance for deciding particular cases. At best, it is a heuristic that
is available for courts to use in deciding how to set the presumptions (e.g., mistrust of business conduct) or
burdens of proof and even in doing that, courts cannot rely on any jurisprudential or theoretical arguments,
presumably having to rely either on their own or on society's attitudes.
44
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual
Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1766 (2003) (post-Chicago antitrust prefers "accuracy over
ease")
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Areeda, Always a Borrower at 1040.
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expert evidence to resolve a specific question in a particular case may help the
elaboration of a rule that can be applied in later cases as precedent, assuming some
degree of stability and similarity of competitive interactions across different markets.47

D. The incorporation of knowledge

However, the courts have not been too welcoming of the more nuanced postChicago approach into antitrust decision-making.The incorporation of economic
knowledge has been constrained both by the way in which economic knowledge develops
and by the courts' ability to absorb such knowledge in decision-making and rule
formulation. After all, the main judicialtool is analogical reasoni ng and an important
lesson of the Chicago revolution has been that analogies apparent at first sight may end
up being poor and misleading guides to decision-making. Furthermore, as Philip Areeda
observed, the process of incorporation of knowledge into doctrine is burdened by the fact
that "[t]he needs and purposes of the law are not necessarily the same as the interests and
objectives of the expert pursuing his own discipline."48
In a recent contribution examining the impact of economic expertise on antitrust
doctrine, Lopatka and Page argue that courts do not rely on expert assistance in order to
acquire the economic knowledge incorporated into doctrine.49 Instead of relying on
expert input, courts develop "economic authority" through an unstructured common law
method of "pragmatically examining the scholarly literature in the context of existing
case law and adopting the most persuasive and plausible accounts" available at the time
of decision.50 Lopatka and Page explain thatthis process of selection is influenced by
"intuitions," "social visions," and "ideologies,"51 as well as legal process considerations
about the institutional capacity of courts to process highly fact specific expert
testimony.52 Furthermore, they recognize that once such economic authority is accepted
into the doctrine even without expert input, it takes precedence over, and sets limits on
the scope of expert testimony that a court can admit in a later case to demonstrate that the

47
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economic authority is either incorrect, or at least inapplicable to the circumstances of that
case.53
In light of this last conclusion, their view that"the informal process of economic
authority has decisive advantages within the antitrust system"54 is surprising. For
instance, they argue that the process of unstructured selection is legitimate because it is
based on the same foundations as the development of precedent.55 However, it was
precisely the limitations of the method of analogical reasoning in antitrust cases that led
to the excesses evident during the Warren Court era. True, courts have legitimate reasons
for setting up barriers to prevent additional context-specific factual inquiry, such as
ensuring coherence in the law,56 and limiting the extent to which courts would have to act
as super-arbiters of alternative economic theories. This is especially important given that,
in most cases, economists do not come to unambiguous or unanimous predictions about
either the purpose or the likely effects of the conduct in question. However, a more
appropriate response to the contestable and evolutionary nature of economic, like any
other knowledge, is to ensure that doctrine permits (and does not foreclose) further
inquiry to both develop new learning and incorporate it into decision-making.
The problem of conflicting expert testimony in antitrust, as in other cases is often
presented through the prism of the paid expert.57 On this view, the function of the courts
in antitrust cases is impaired by the absence of truly neutral and competent experts, since
experts hired by the parties will testify to any proposition in support of the case of their
client.58 However, there are other explanations for expert contests. It may be that the
difference of opinion among two economic experts is genuine, yet one economist has
employed faulty reasoning or methodology. Or alternatively, even with both proper
reasoning and methodology, the economists may arrive at a genuine disagreement about
the competitive significance of the case, particularlyif the outcomes of interest extend to
the medium to longer term. A survey of articles in the peer reviewed journals in any
discipline will reveal numerous disagreements between experts even outside the litigation
context. Whatever the reason for the contest, in most cases courts do not have the tools to
resolve it. Yet to deny the validity of such input altogether by invoking authority based
on judicial "intuitions" and "ideologies" seems a peculiar response to this problem.5960
53
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Such a response is particularly problematic in light of the fact that the economic
understanding of particular forms of conduct or market phenomenaevolves , particularly
since market structures, organizations and strategies change. Antitrust decision-making
relied on economic theory long before the Chicago School, even if such reliance was not
openly acknowledged by judges.61 Controversy among economists about the welfare
implications of past business practices continues long after those practices have ceased.
Conduct which might be recognized as predatory or anticompetitive today, might not
have been seen in the same way in the past, not only because economists understand the
world better today, but also because the same conduct might not have been as important
in the past. Yet, if the courts insist on filtering out the factual evidence about the context
of current cases through the prism of past "economic authority" they fail to appreciate the
ways in which current cases are different, or the ways in which conduct which was once
benign may now be of concern, and vice versa.
In his book An Empirically Based Microeconomics62, Herbert Simon criticizes
modern economic theory, arguing that economic modeling is detached from reality and
cannot give concrete advice to policy-makers.63 In a thoughtful review of Simon's book,
the economist Ariel Rubinstein explains64
[W]hat we really do in economic theory is to study
arguments. Understanding what sort of arguments could be
made about a situation does not guarantee our
understanding of when this or any other argument will be
made. And understanding arguments that people use is very
far from predicting the kinds of things that economists
attempt to predict or at least try to understand.

compelled to publish their testimonies in peer-reviewed economic journals, as a way of incurring reputation
costs for testimony which is markedly implausible. Areeda, Always a Borrower at 1036. However, Areeda
recognizes that this proposal is impractical because it only (partially) corrects for the "hired gun" problem,
but not the other reasons for contest and disagreement which could provide an obstacle to courts in
resolving concrete antitrust problems. Timing is crucial in this context. Even if an expert has employed, in
good faith, some form of faulty methodology, ex post publication will reveal this error later, after the
judicial tribunal has already decided the case. The key is to incorporate this process of peer-review into the
resolution of the particular case. See infra n.XX.
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This view suggests both a glimmer of hope and an inherent limitation upon the use of
economics in antitrust decision-making, including more theoretically ambitious economic
modeling. To the extent that economics seeks to understand the kinds of arguments that
can be made about a particular situation, this gives us hope that economic learning can be
incorporated into the legal regime. After all, lawyering is all about crafting arguments
that explain the reasons for, and likely consequences of, particular conduct as against the
background of rules which regulate that conduct. But to the extent that economics
enhances our tools of argumentation and helps antitrust advocates, how does it help the
decision-maker? It might help the judge discard certain arguments, because they cannot
validly be made in particular circumstances, but beyond that it only provides additional
valuable arguments without necessarily giving further guidance on how to weigh them
against each other — in order to determine whether anticompetitive effects are likely and
in what timeframe — or, against other valid legal or policy arguments. As a result,
Lopatka and Page's "economic authority" may be nothing more than the courts'
formulation of a simple proposition that disposes of the majority of cases, relieving them
of the responsibility to mediate and balance such arguments.

E. The law and economics of predation

The evolution in the law of predatory pricing provides a good illustration of the
limits of the process of judicial learning described thus far. During the early years, injury
to a competitor in itself was seen as destructive to the competitive process. Puttinga
competitor out of business through aggressive pricing not only destroyed the productive
capacity of a firm, in turn affecting the livelihood of the owners and employees, but also
increased market concentration, eliminating the competitive constraint on other market
players. Predatory pricing was a vibrant area of public and private enforcement. In the
absence of a method to distinguish predatory from ordinary price cuts, courts relied on
proxy evidence of anticompetitive intent. As juries were receptive to these claims, the
lower courts frequently awarded large treble damage awards against price-cutting firms
even in cases where the defendant firm had insubstantial market share.
Attempts to develop easily administrable rules, based on economic theory, that
would provide a nuanced predation law have been unsuccessful. At a time when there
was little economic analysis of the predation phenomenon, Areeda and Turner used a
simple economic argument, based on profit-maximization, to develop a simple rule that
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guided both the courts the marketplace. 65 Under the Areeda-Turner test, below-cost
price cuts were presumptively considered predatory, since such price cuts could not be
profitable unless the firm was expecting at some future date to recover the losses through
higher prices after the exit of some of its rivals. While this rule was apparently elegant
and relevant in different market contexts, attempts to apply it generated further
theoretical and practical inquiries about definition and measurement of costs, as well as
possible alternative explanations for low pricing. To resolve such inquiries, required
admission of factual evidence and therefore left the hands of juries and trial judges
largely unrestrained. This undermined both the rule's elegance and its utility in
discouraging opportunistic use of antitrust law.
Thus, the only way to impose discipline on this area of law was to foreclose the
courts from considering predation cases. In a number of discrete steps, the Supreme
Court relied on summary judgment as a procedural tool66 and Chicago analysis of
recoupment as a substantive or doctrinal tool to achieve this goal. Chicago scholars
suggested that courts should sidestep the costs inquiry, which had not proven to be
particularly helpful or tractable, and focus instead on the likelihood of recoupment by the
defendant firm. In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp67 the
Supreme Court decided that analyzing the likelihood of recoupment was a threshold
condition for a finding of predation. To establish this rule, Justice Kennedy relied on
three propositions. First, while accepting that pricing below some measure of cost is the
appropriate definition of predation, the Court did not specify the way to define or
measure costs. Second, a plaintiff in a predatory pricing case had to prove that the
defendant was likely to recoup any losses from predatory pricing by raising consumer
prices after the targeted firms were eliminated. Finally, and perhaps more detrimentally,
the Court accepted the then reigning Chicago view that predatory conduct was unlikely to
occur or to succeed. However, this last point was not a fully theorized conclusion, and
was based on only a limited number of empirical studies.68
An unfortunate effect of this formulation was that the doctrine precluded further
examination or elaboration of any of the three claims that supplied its basis. Implicitly
sidestepping the question of costs discouraged any further inquiry into an appropriate
65
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definition and measurement of costs for the purposes of identifying below-cost pricing.
Further, the Court explicitly discouraged lower court from examining the meaning and
forms of recoupment that may make predation a rational anticompetitive strategy. The
claim that a firm was unlikely to recoup (and therefore engage in predation), signaled to
lower courts that absent extraordinary circumstances, predation cases were to be disposed
of at summary judgment. Thus, no successful predation cases have been brought since
Brooke Group, despite the fact that the economic learning has brought additional
arguments and considerations to bear on the rationality of predation as an anticompetitive
strategy.69
More recent economic modeling does not embrace the Chicago proposition that
predation cannot be a profitable strategy for dominant firms. To assist the courts in
deciding predation cases, Bolton, Brodley and Riordan have collected the emergent
economic consensus on predatory strategies.70 While accepting that the likelihood of
recoupment provides an appropriate framework of analysis, they draw upon economic
models that incorporate theories of strategic dynamic interaction among firmsin the
presence of imperfect information. Such theories demonstrate how predation could be a
rational and profitable strategy for a dominant firm in different market contexts. Where
an entrant has imperfect information about the cost structure of the incumbent firm, the
incumbent may engage in predatory pricing in order to send the wrong cost signal to the
potential entrant and deter entry; or a dominant firm selling in numerous markets may
engage in predatory pricing against a firm in one market in order to establish a predatory
reputation thereby deterring entry or price cutting in other markets in which it operates
(recouping in those other markets, rather than the market where it cut prices); or a
dominant firm may engage in predatory pricing in order to reduce the rival's short run
profitability so as to induce its creditors (who are imperfectly informed about the entrant's
potential) to withdraw their financing.71
The economic theories that Bolton, Brodley and Riordan draw upon dynamic
modeling that incorporates more contextual factors and strategic considerations relevant
to identifying novel forms of predatory conduct. As with many other post-Chicago
69
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models, the welfare predictions of those theories are highly sensitive to the starting
assumptions of the model. According to Elzinga and Mills, given this lack of robustness
in predicitions, such models cannot be a useful guide to judicial decision-making because
they cannot be translated into ex ante rules that would apply across different contexts.72
However, to reject such economic evidence simply because it does not easily
translate into ex ante rules seems paradoxical. If the welfare implications of particular
theoretical models are highly dependent on the starting assumptions of such models , to
answer the question of whether a model can be used to analyze the case at hand, the court
must determine whether the market context of the case maps well onto the assumptions of
the model. Therefore, lack of robustness is not a reason to reject evidence (including
factual evidence as well as expert assessment) that the market context under
consideration is precisely the one in which predation is a rational strategy which is likely
to harm consumers. Instead, cases such as Matsushita and Brooke Group have
encouraged courts to address the recoupment issue at the summary judgment stage, which
necessarily involves a curtailed evidentiary record.73
The most recent DoJ prosecution of American Airlines for predatory pricing
relying on the work of Brodley, Bolton and Riordan was also rebuffed at the summary
judgment stage, although for different reasons. Both the District Court74 and the Tenth
Circuit75 accepted that modern economic theory puts some doubt on the Brooke Group
view that predation is unlikely to occur and even less likely to succeed. Nonetheless, the
Court concluded that the Department of Transport had not adduced sufficient evidence
that American's strategy involved below-cost pricing to survive a motion for summary
judgment, despite the fact that the government complaint relied on four alternative
theories of cost to demonstrate that the prices were predatorily low. The Court latched
onto the difficulty in determining whether American had sacrificed profits, as part of its
alleged predation strategy, due to the substantial portion of arbitrarily allocated costs
involved, because of American's coarse cost accounting.76
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Thus, on either the Brooke Group or the American Airlines view, the antitrust
plaintiff will have substantial difficulty getting past a defendant's motion for summary
judgment. The courts avoid entering the fray of deciding complex predation cases by
either (i) invoking the incantation that predation occurs rarely and requiring a strong
showing of likely recoupment (Matsushita and Brooke Group) or (ii) requiring a precise
showing that the price was below some undefined measure of cost, which plaintiffs will
generally be unable to do (American Airlines).77 The fact that both of these approaches
dispose of cases on summary judgment suggests that courts consciously tie their hands
from considering context specific evidence that might muddy the neatness of current
rules, and open the doors to the jury presumably encouraging opportunistic plaintiffs.

F. Conclusion
The Chicago "New Learning," which advocated a minimalist antitrust policy,
reflected not only dissatisfaction with the excesses of the Warren era antitrust, but also a
number of wider social trends, including the shift away from production-based, towards
consumption based communities of identity,78 as well as growing suspicion about the
pernicious effects of the use of governmental or bureaucratic power vis-à-vis business
power.79 Most importantly, the Chicago school sought to incorporate the growing
understanding about the new model of the firm that had replaced the decentralized antebellum economy of individual traders in arms-length relationships. The arguments used
by Chicago scholars were well-accepted in organization theory and industry economics.80
They reflected the Chandlerian81 model of the corporation thathad come to dominate
U.S. industry since the end of the 19th century. Firms, according to this model, were
large multi-product organizations (structured by divisions) that were closed hierarchies,
designed to generate rules in order to break down complex problems and goals into
manageable tasks and to monitor the compliance of large numbers of subordinates in
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performing those tasks.82 Minimization of transaction costs that stem from bargaining
problems, shirking and other forms of subordinate opportunism, was the main driving
force towards integration within the Chandlerian firm, and provided the underpinnings
for the Chicago attack on antitrust hostility to vertical restraints and mergers.
Yet courts are not a particularly good venue for either promoting economic
efficiency, or for trading off efficiency against other societal values. Doctrine does not
provide any useful guidance to courts in deciding modern antitrust cases based on the
efficiency criterion. The existing categories of judicial analysis (such as the per se and the
rule of reason) are largely empty, as courts grapple to adapt the methods of a processbased legal regime to an effects based (regulatory) policy.83 While the new antitrust is
said to incorporate the benefits of economic learning, this is a very partial claim which
masks the extent to which presumptions continue to play a role in antitrust decisionmaking. The doctrinal incorporation of economic learning is limited by the institutional
limitations of the courts and is generally biased against intervention. While some have
endorsed the judicial development of "economic precedent," this is a dubious kind of
precedent that does not reflect a wider economic consensus, but instead involves a
judicial re-characterization of economic learning to adapt it into rules thatdispose of
cases, rather than engaging in searching economic inquiry.

III. The new cases - the innovation perspective
A. The Post-Chandlerian firm

While the Chicago antitrust revolution took place long after the emergence of the
Chandlerian firm, the world that the law regulates is not static either.84 Parallel with the
efforts to update antitrust law and doctrine to incorporate the lessons of industrial
organization, the past two decades have witnessed fundamental shifts in the nature and
the organization of the firm, the methods of production and competition, as well as the
purposes and forms of inter-firm relationships. By contrast to the integrated hierarchical
firm, the emerging post-Chandlerian business organization is described as "federated and
open"—relying on collaboration, rather than integration—and "networked" so that
82
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information flows not only top-down, but also upwards and sideways.85 The profound
changes taking placein the principles of business organization have a few important
features:86
Firms have changed the scope of their activities, typically
refocusing on their core businesses and outsourcing many
of the activities that they previously regarded as central. ...
Many have also redefined the nature of their relationships
with customers and suppliers, often replacing simple arms
length dealings with long-term partnerships. ... By these
measures, coupled with improved information and
measurement systems and redesigned performance
measurement systems, they have sought to increase the
speed of decision-making and to tap the knowledge and
energy of their employees in ways that have not been tried
before. To facilitate coordination and learning, they have
experimented with linking people in different parts of their
organizations directly, so that communications are more
horizontal and not just up and down the hierarchy.
The shift in organizational structure was precipitated by the limits of the hierarchical
model of the Chandlerian firm in resolving the problems of industrial organization, as
well as shifts in theunderlying market environments in which the new firm has to
operate. In particular, given changes in technology and the intensification of global
competition, market changes are more rapid and on-going, which is why the environment
in which the modern firm operates is described as more "turbulent"87 or "volatile."88 Top
executives neither possess the information about market changes and new technologies,
nor can they absorb such information rapidly enough to use the knowledge to formulate
strategy top-down.89 The new firm is vertically disintegrated, makingdeeper
collaboration and information exchange among firms essential.90 As a corollary,such
novel forms of organizing production present new challenges in governing inter-firm
relationships. Since antitrust is a tool for moderating inter-firm relationships, the new
forms of production present novel and unique antitrust challenges.
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B. Innovation

Because the underlying market environment in which the new firm operates is
fast-changing and turbulent, a key aspect of firm success in new markets is not planning
and cost-minimization, but continuous innovation enabling the firm to adjust its decisions
and be responsive to market changes that are very difficult to predict. In this context, the
firm's key challenge is not to minimize the cost of producing and delivering an existing
product with a stable demand to the market, but instead to ensure that its product design
keeps up with the future requirements of the market. Such a change of focus also opens
the door to different kinds of anticompetitive strategies, which aim to disrupt a
competitor's ability to innovate. In an increasing number of antitrust cases the effects of
market structure and conduct on the ability to firms innovate (and consequently the pace
of innovation) have assumed center stage. Some commentators have gone so far as to
suggest that promoting innovation is the primary goal or the touchstone of the modern
competition policy.91
At least at the conceptual level, there is no reason for an efficiency-minded
competition policy to be focused only on static allocative efficiency and conduct that
restricts output and raises short run prices, without being concerned about dynamic
efficiency, namely development of novel products and processes of production. In
dynamic modern markets, the introduction of new products or processes is the main form
of firm rivalry that dissipates supra-economic profits and improves consumer welfare.
However, moving from the conceptual to the practical, we have already shown
that a key constraint on extending the mandate of antitrust policy has always been the
institutional capacity of the antitrust decision-makers to take a broader range of issues
into account and to formulate and supervise effective remedies.92 Both the traditional and
the Chicago approach to antitrust intervention deny any possibility for judges to trade-off
some goals against others.93 The old caselaw often made the point that protecting the
competitive process is the "law of the land" and courts had no mandate to trade-off
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competition for other socially desirable goals.94 Similarly, the Chicago view is deeply
suspicious of judicial balancing and sees the focus on short-run allocative efficiency as
the only way to anchor judicial decision-makingfarfrom error. T he promotion of
innovation and industrial progress—whether they were consistent or in conflict with the
reigning antitrust view of competition—could be left to the market or to more targeted
policy interventions by the other arms of government.
In the aftermath of increased antitrust litigation in high technology industries,
Posner observed that"antitrust doctrine is supple enough, and its commitment to
economic rationality strong enough, to take in stride the competitive issues presented by
the new economy."95 By contrast, Posner singles out the institutional constraints as more
significant, including the absence of neutral expert assistance to courts, the slow pace of
litigation compared to the dynamic and fast-changing nature of the markets, and the fact
that this dynamism exacerbates the difficulties in fashioning and supervising effective
antitrust remedies.96
However, Posner's description of the doctrine as "supple" simply obscures the fact
that in the absence of doctrine judges have no legal guidance in deciding these cases. As
the F.T.C. recognized in the Three Tenors case,97 the distinction between the per se rule
and the rule of reason has become largely blurred, with most cases inviting some degree
of competitive effects analysis. Similarly, the distinction between vertical and horizontal
inter-firm relationships is not as critical in modern markets—the modern firm is vertically
disintegrated, and collaborates with many different firms who are at least potential
participants in the same market. Some of the staples of antitrust analysis, including
defining markets, calculating market shares, and comparing prices to cost have become
strained and of limited assistance in new economy markets.98 The fact that there are no
ex ante rules to constrain judicial discretion, does allow courts to engage in the kind of ex
post, all things considered, judging of what's best for economic efficiency that Posner has
advocated elsewhere.99 Those who have greater faith in the judicial capacity to perform a
94
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central role in antitrust decision-making and the judicial process to cope with the
increased complexity, deny that even the institutional problems identified by Posner are
significant or insurmountable.100
Yet the evidence suggests that the institutional limits of the judicial process as a
format for resolving antitrust problems in contemporary markets is broader than the
problem of limited access to truly neutral expert assistance. As already shown, access to
an economic expert independent of the litigating parties does not guarantee the proper
incorporation of knowledge into antitrust decision-making. Further, given the complexity
of modern technologies, analysis of competitive dynamics in such markets is inherently
multidimensional, and the need for expert input goes beyond economic analysis, to
evidence from experts from other fields (including engineers, scientists, programmers) on
issues of design, capabilities and robustness of alternative designs, the need for
interconnectivity between different products and so on. In this context, even where
independent expert assistance is available, the more challenging problem is to facilitate
the communication among experts, and with the decision-maker, so that different
conceptual schemes and perspectives for problem-solving can be brought to bear not only
to identify the problem, but also in formulating workable solutions.

C. New rules of deference
Given the technological and economic complexity of new production
relationships, and the antitrust courts' hostility towards context specific factual
evidence,101 the initial judicial responses to antitrust cases involving high technology
industries tended towards fashioning new rules of deference to business conduct. The
bias against antitrust involvement was the result of a general preference for broad and
easily applicable doctrinal rules and legitimate fear that any other strategy would place
courts at the center of decisions ordinarily left to the market. Whatever difficulties courts
face in gauging price effects, predicting effects on innovation involves qualitative
judgments about which firm's innovative efforts would make a greater contribution to
social welfare.
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(1) Product Development as a trump
Product development decisions are ordinarily the prerogative of the firm that
brings the product to market. Product development succeeds when the firm makes the
product more attractive for current users. However, product development decisions can
also have exclusionary effects on rival producers. For example, a producer of two
products can integrate them technologically. While this may bring efficiencies to current
users, it can also foreclose sales for a firm participating in one market only. Or,
alternatively a firm may develop a product which is not compatible and does not
interoperate with those of its rivals, again with potential exclusionary effects.
Where such conduct is subjected to antitrust scrutiny, one can envisage two
possible responses by the courts. One would be to subject the integration to a full rule of
reason analysis, balancing the efficiencies reaped by consumers from the integrated
product, against the exclusionary effects on rivals and the consequential net effects on
prices or innovation in the market.102 As Salop and Romaine have pointed out, if courts
shy away from performing this balancing task, they would be dealing themselves out of
antitrust, since this is precisely the area in which many contentious issues are likely to
arise in modern markets.103
However, courtshave refused to perform this function not because they are antiantitrust, but because, in the absence of doctrinal guidance, they do not have the tools
with which to perform this task effectively or legitimately, and in a way which would
provide actors with a clear guide to compliance. In the first iteration of the government's
litigation against Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit refused to entertain the DoJ's claim that by
combining the browser Internet Explorer with the Windows operating system, Microsoft
violated the prohibition on product integration in the consent decree thatsettl ed the
original DoJ complaint. Microsoft had argued that the combination was a single product
since the code of the browser was technologically inseparable from the operating system.
Given the technological complexity involved,the D.C. Circuit adopted a highly
deferential standard for product integration cases in high tech markets, whereby an
antitrust defendant would prevail so long as it "could proffer any plausible non-pretextual
product improvement explanation for the integration" of the two products, irrespective of
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the significance of any exclusionary effects on rivals.104 If it were otherwise, the court
would be engaging in picking winners and firms would be unable to foresee whether their
product design violated the antitrust laws.
In the government's subsequent prosecution of Microsoft for violating § 2 of the
Sherman Act, theen banc opinion of the D.C. Circuit retreated from the above deferential
standard, but this was only an apparent retreat.105 As a matter of doctrine, the Court’s
method for analyzing the §2 claim has widely been interpreted as an endorsement of the
rule of reason balancing approach,106 ultimately requiring a judicial determination
whether any exclusionary effects asserted by the plaintiff were outweighed by procompetitive or efficiency justifications asserted by the defendant. However, in deciding
the case on the merits the D.C. Circuit avoided having to provide a method for
performing the balancing task by rejecting Microsoft's proffered business or efficiency
justifications for most of the impugned practices. In fact, in every instance where the
Court accepted Microsoft’s asserted justifications, such as the development of the
incompatible Java virtual machine, the conduct was not condemned.107 Thus, the method
espoused in the Court's en banc opinion was facially different from thatof the earlier
panel, yet, in its application, it did not differ appreciably from the "any plausible ...
explanation" standard.

(2) Intellectual Property as a trump
Protection of an antitrust defendant's intellectual property rights is another general
rule of deference increasingly invoked by courts to justify antitrust non-intervention, even
in cases where the plaintiff claims that an antitrust defendant's conduct would impair
innovation. The courts increasingly accept the proposition that protecting intellectual
property rights is a trump card defense that an antitrust defendant can invoke against
claims of antitrust violations.108 Such a proposition would substantially curtail the scope
104
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for antitrust intervention in new technology markets, since these markets are
characterized by the proliferation of intellectual property protection given the importance
of innovation in market success.
The tendency to defer to intellectual property rights is a reversal of an earlier
approach, when antitrust courts and agencies were very inhospitable to defendant
justifications based on intellectual property rights.109 Such hostility was so deep rooted,
that ownership of intellectual property placed an antitrust defendant in a disadvantageous
position ever since the Supreme Court held that the ownership of a patent created a
presumption that the owner possessed market power,110 making it more (rather than less)
likely that defendants would be subjected to antitrust duties.
Yet judicial deference to intellectual property rights so as to defeat any competing
antitrust considerations is based on both instrumental and institutional considerations.
The former strict approach in favor of antitrust duties was bound to be re-evaluated, as
antitrust moved away from reliance on broad per se rules towards a methodology more
attuned to market effects. Furthermore, if innovation is indeed the key aspect of
competitive interaction in new economy markets, intellectual property rights, such as
patents and copyrights, are legislative rights of exclusivity. Those rights are created
under a constitutionally conferred grant of power to Congress to promote the
development of the sciences and arts,111 in light of the public good characteristics of
innovation.
Whatever doubts courts might have about their ability to engage in the modern
quasi-regulatory antitrust analysis, protection of property rights has been one of the tasks
appropriate even for a minimalist judiciary. Property doctrines are well-settled and the
methods of analysis, at least in principle, rely upon retrospective characterization of
rights and violations (even in the context of complex technological claims and
industries), which seems an inherently judicial task.112 Furthermore, property law exalts
the right to exclude as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
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commonly recognized as property.”113 As Thomas Merrill has observed “no other right
has been singled out for such extravagant endorsement by the Court.”114
More recently, the Court has abolished the presumption that patent owners
possess market power, holding that the level of market power depends on the degree to
which the product is effective and popular, as well as the availability of substitutes.115
The Chicago view goes a step further, being highly suspicious of the ability of firms in a
market economy to become entrenched into positions of market power beyond the short
run, absent government regulations restricting entry to the industry.116 Short-run and
temporary acquisition of market power is not viewed as a problem, instead it supplies the
incentive for firms to innovate or invest in infrastructure, where the advantages such
investments confer are not perfectly appropriable by either the intellectual property
protection or by other barriers to entry in the market.
The foregoing view now apparently findssupport in the Supreme Court, where in
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, writing for the
Court Justice Scalia explained that imposition of antitrust duties on an owner of
infrastructure is both unappealing and difficult to supervise by the courts:
Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an
infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve
their customers. Compelling such firms to share the source
of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying
purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive
… to invest in … economically beneficial facilities.
Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as
central planners.117
Although Trinko did not involve intellectual property, the reasoning is equally apposite to
such a case, where a firm invests in R&Dleading to a commercializable invention that
both confers on the firm an advantage in the form of a patent (or some other form of
intellectual property protection), and makes that firm uniquely placed to fulfill a customer
need. To the extent that Justice Scalia’s dictum commands majority support on the
Court, it suggests a highly deferential approach to intellectual property rights and a
limited role for antitrust in such cases more generally.
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IV. Innovation - market structure and collaboration
Apart from the limited doctrinal guidance, the main constraint on the ability of
antitrust to play an active role in promoting innovation is the absence of an apparent
straight-forward relationship between the structure of the market and the rate of
innovation. However, an examination of actual practices that firms use in order to
innovate in dynamic markets reveals that while incentives play an important role as a
spur for innovation, an equally important consideration is how firms relax the constraint
on their ability to innovate through learning about an increasingly complex world.
Regardless of the market share it possesses, and the market structure in which it operates,
the modern firm can only overcome the limitations of its own capacity and knowledge
through collaborating with other organizations. While such collaboration is clearly
beneficial, it also makes the firm vulnerable to opportunism of its collaborators and it is
precisely the context in which antitrust cases in high technology industries arise.

A. The link between structure and innovation

Positing a relationship between market structure and the rate of innovation is even
more elusive than the link between market structure and output (or price).118 This inquiry
is beset by numerous conceptual problems, including measuring innovation, which is a
dynamic concept and because reliance on proxies, such as research and development
expenditures, is manifestly inadequate.119 An examination of three important
determinants of innovation (incentives to innovate, capacity to invest in innovation and
capacity to acquire knowledge), demonstrates that neither a decentralized market of
atomistic firms, nor a concentrated market characterized by large firms can guarantee
rapid learning and innovation.
In a decentralized market of atomistic firms, multiple innovation sources and
competition among firms to bring a new product to the market could lead to faster rates
of innovation, as well as a less concentrated product market once the product is
developed and the technology dissipated. Innovative ideas are more likely to emerge
from new and/or small enterprises that do not have an existing and secure stream of
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profits.120 Yet small firms can only access local knowledge and might not have the
funds, or the incentive, to invest in commercializing the innovation, particularly since it
would be difficult to appropriate the benefits of such investments.
Nor is a large firm in a concentrated market a guaranteed to generate rapid
innovation. Larger firms can take advantage of economies of scale and efficiencies in
research, development, but also in subsequent production and commercialization of an
innovative idea. Bigness and high market concentration can also provide the capacity to
invest in R&D, because the firm can more readily finance such expenditures out of
existing profits. Furthermore, a firm that controls a larger share of the market can
appropriate the benefits of innovative investments more easily, and appropriabilityof
such investments is only enhanced by the robust protection of intellectual property rights.
However, large incumbent firms may also face problems in generating innovative
ideas. Larger enterprises have quasi-bureaucratic governance and management
structures. Decision-makers within such organizations tend to rely on branch-knowledge
in formulating new decisions and policies.121 In particular, new decisions are highly
contingent upon the familiar decision-steps that have taken the organization up to this
point122 and, as a consequence, they will often be blind to solutions which are well
outside tried and tested routines. Scholars of large incumbent firms have noted that such
organizations are good at developing "sustaining" innovations, which are based on small
and incremental engineering improvements that serve existing customers.123
As Bendor demonstrated,124 two independent persons working on the same
problem are more likely to develop a solution working separately than together, even if it
is assumed that "success breeds success" (so that if the individuals work together, the
conditional likelihood of the second team member successfully solving a second problem
given that the first member has already developed one good solution, is higher than if the
two individuals worked separately). Thus, somewhat counter intuitively, "[i]f what is
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important is that at least one good idea occurs, the pair working separately is
unambiguously more likely to achieve that criterion of success."125
The lesson from both Lindblom and Bendor's treatment of the limits on
developing new solutions is that, even within alarge enterprise, management will need to
generate some degree of diversity and independence if new, innovative and commercially
successful ideas are to be developed.126 However, fostering diversity within the firm is
no easy task. Determining the optimal level of diversity and delegation, as well as
selecting from among different project-ideas generated by different units, may be a nearimpossible task given the limited knowledge of management.127 Further, diversity and
delegation create agency problems in the form of separate power bases within a firm,
each with their own interests distinct from those of the firm, producing the risk of
bargaining failures as well as the possibility of collusive conduct among different firm
divisions to advance purely local interests.

B. Between market and hierarchy - collaboration
One way that the modern firm can garner the benefits of both decentralized
production modes and integration is through inter-firm collaboration. Collaboration
allows the firm to access other sources of knowledge from other market participants who
are attempting to solve a similar problem, to pick up promising ideas from such sources
and jointly develop solutions, instead of fostering optimal diversity within the firm
. 128
Such outside sources of knowledge can come from the firm's suppliers or other vertically
related enterprises, but also the firm's customers,129 its current or potential competitors,
enterprises operating in very different industries130 and others.131
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The sociological literature examining innovation practices of firms in new
technology markets observes a marked trend towards cooperative, simultaneous and
"experiential" innovation, that produces successful and (importantly for a dynamic
environment) robust forms of problem solving and product development. In a study of
different innovation models pursued by firms in the high-paced computer industry,
Brown and Eisenhardt observe those firms do not rely on bursts of radical change
emerging from tightly structured design processes with extensive planning and a
substantial investment in one version of the future.132 Instead, innovative change is
continuous and adaptive, relying on experimental products and strategic alliances.
Brown and Eisenhardt observe that either the "planned" or the "experiential"
innovation strategy may be appropriate for a particular firm, depending on the underlying
market environment and structure.133 The planned (lock-step) process is appropriate in
more "certain" environments where underlying changes occur more incrementally and are
therefore more predictable.134 Experiential development strategies emerge in market
environments which are unpredictable, intractable and uncertain, where players must rely
on accelerated learning, real time interaction, iteration and flexibility.135
Long before the more recent antitrust caselaw, Jorde and Teece described the
tendency towards collaborative "simultaneous innovation":
[I]nnovation does not necessarily begin with research ; nor
is the process serial. … [I]t does require rapid feedback,
mid-course corrections to design, and redesign. This
conceptualization … also recognizes the constant feedback
between and among activities, and the involvement of a
wide variety of economic actors and organizations that
need not have a simple upstream-downstream relationship
to each other. … R&D personnel must be closely connected
to the manufacturing and marketing personnel and to
external sources of supply of new components and
complementary technologies so that supplier, manufacturer
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and customer reactions can be fed back into the design
process rapidly.136
The post-Chandlerian open, federated and networked firm, arises precisely as an answer
to this need for the firm to collaborate extensively and deeply in order to be able to
engage in such on-going innovation.
The nature of technology and forms of production in these markets alleviate some
traditional antitrust concerns, while creating new ones. For example, the rapid changes
that take place in technology-driven markets make market power less durable, as new and
better products can easily enter markets and quickly replace existing ones. This
observation, coupled with the lack of a strong link between observable industry structure
and the rate of innovation, which could be translated into easily administrable rules,
might suggest a sanguine view about the relevance of a 19th century discipline in these
modern contexts.137
However, since antitrust is a tool which aids to solve the problems in industrial
organization, in order to improve the competitive operation of markets, such a sanguine
view may be both too complacent and too skeptical. If, on the one hand, this view
reflects a belief that the new principles of industrial organization have solved all
problems of inter-firm interaction, which might affectindustry performance and
consumer welfare, they are too complacent because problems in these relationships
persist and are reflected in many modern antitrust cases. On the other hand, the view that
the problems are of such complexity that the existing antitrust institutions cannot
effectively grapple with them may be too skeptical, since antitrust interventions in the
U.S. as elsewhere, are already developing solutions that overcome the institutional limits
of antitrust.

C. Reinterpreting the cases
A number of antitrust cases, in which the promotion of innovation provided a
central pillar of the theory of the case and where the role of antitrust duties vis-à-vis
intellectual property rights was a key issue, illustrate both the importance of collaboration
and the need for collaborating firms to establish a common language, in the form of a
136
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platform or standards that enable them to work together. In this context, antitrust
disputes result from break-downs in collaboration and attempts by one firm to appropriate
the fruits of the joint collaboration, or prevent other collaborators from innovating. This
re-interpretation of the caselaw demonstrates that standard tools of antitrust analysis are
of limited utility in resolving these problems, but also, as the Article will go on to argue,
that an absolute view of the exclusivity of intellectual property rights might be a poor
guide for decision-makers.

(1) Intel
The FTC's complaint against Intel arosefrom a break down in a collaborative
relationship due to a bargaining failure between parties over dividing the fruits of their
collaboration. The case involved a deeply collaborative relationship between Intel, who
with over 80 percent of the sales in that market is the dominant producer of
microprocessors (the "central processing unit of a computer system"),138 and three
companies producing microprocessor related technology (Digital, Intergraph and
Compaq) that sought the assistance of the FTC. As the FTC recognized, Intel's
development and marketing of the microprocessor was dependent on cooperation with a
many other firms:
Intel promotes and markets its microprocessors by
providing customers with technical information about new
Intel products in advance of their commercial release. ...
Subject to [disclosure] restrictions ... Intel makes such
information widely available to customers, including
manufacturers of personal computers, workstations, and
servers. Such relationships have substantial commercial
benefits for both parties: Intel's customers benefit because
the advance technical information enables them to develop
and introduce new computer products incorporating the
latest microprocessor technology as early as possible, and
Intel benefits because those customers design their new
computer systems so as to incorporate, and effectively
endorse, Intel's newest microprocessor products.
This need to collaborate does not arise merely because Intel and the complainants
produced complementary products that had to interoperate.139 As the FTC complaint
138
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pointed out "Intergraph provided Intel with feedback that was essential for Intel's
penetration of the workstation market and otherwise validated the use of Intel's products
... for what was at the time a new market segment for Intel."140 Further, the three
complaining companies were among the chief customers for Intel's microprocessors.141
Intel's decision to stop providing advance technical information to the three
companies was prompted by their litigation alleging that Intel's products infringed their
patents. Any dispute between collaborators over the terms, and particularly the price of
licensing intellectual property, is a dispute over the allocation of the joint surplus,
irrespective of whether Intel's conduct did indeed infringe its collaborators' patents, or
whether any infringement was conscious or accidental.142
As Commissioner Swindle recognized in his dissent from the final order, the
FTC's theory of anticompetitive harm was somewhat unorthodox, since no chain of
causation was specified from Intel's conduct to its ability to strengthen its market power.
The complainant companies were not Intel's competitors. Nor were Intel's actions
ultimately directed at any competitors or designed to strengthen Intel's monopoly in the
microprocessor market.143 Even focusing on the ex post effects of Intel's conduct on
innovation, Commissioner Swindle commented that there was no evidence that Intel's
actions "threatened to harm the consuming public" or stem the "tide of innovation and
improvement" in the industry.144
In response, the FTC majority argued, somewhat unpersuasively, thatthe consent
order was a pre-trial settlement which "necessarily prevents [the Commission] from
making any final judgment about the actual evidence of harm to competition from Intel's
conduct."145 Notwithstanding this concession, the main concern for the majority
Commissioners was to create conditions in which the disputing companies could resume
their collaboration.146 Further, the majority were concerned about the effect that Intel's
resort to self-help (in withholding crucial information) would have on the ex ante
140
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incentives for inter-firm collaboration, where a firm which owns a platform can act as a
gate-keeper with disproportionate power to make such a threat.147

(2) Microsoft before the European Commission148
Microsoft's collaboration with firms in the industry was also at the center of the
European Commission’s complaint and decision thatMicrosoft violated European
competition law.149 The decision was based, in part, on Microsoft's refusal to provide
interoperability information to other producers of work group servers so that their servers
could call up functions on the Microsoft Windows operating system, which runs on the
vast majority of individual computers. The Commission's final order was for Microsoft
to fully disclose the information necessary to ensure complete interoperability to rivals,
such as Sun and Novell. The Commission emphasized the fact that Microsoft had
previously provided full disclosure of such information. However, once Microsoft
developed, corrected and launched its own work group server, it ceased to disclose the
full information and “disrupt[ed] previous levels of interoperability.”150
In defending its actions, Microsoft relied on its absolute prerogative as the owner
of intellectual property rights, arguing that its conduct was necessary to protect its
intellectual property and furthermore, was not inconsistent with vigorous competition
with its rivals. To the extent that Microsoft invested in infrastructure (including both the
operating system and the work group server that interoperates smoothly with Windows),
this gave Microsoft an advantage in serving customers needs (to use the Trinko
language).151 If this conduct could not strengthen Microsoft's power, i.e. if Microsoft
cannot raise the price of the operating system or the work group server, and the
consumers can obtain a server that interoperates seamlessly with the operating system,
there does not appear to be consumer harm from Microsoft’s conduct.
Apart from emphasizing that Microsoft’s conduct seriously impeded the rivals’
ability to compete in the market,152 the Commission argued that if Microsoft could refuse
to continue the prior level of disclosure to its rivals, this would lead to a net reduction in
147
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innovation, even if mandating disclosure would reduce the incentives for Microsoft to
innovate.153 As Fox has pointed out, the Commission’s claims about ex post effects on
innovation can be contested, particularly since Microsoft’s practices have not had a
detrimental effect on the ability of Sun or Novel to compete effectively to the point where
they might be eliminated from the market. Further, at least at first sight the
Commission’s claim of a negative net effect on innovation in work group servers may be
viewed as speculative, and not rooted in the evidence.154 Focusing only on the ex post
incentives, Microsoft’s refusal to provide full interoperability information might spur
companies such as Sun and Novel to innovate more vigorously, to make their work group
servers attractive to consumers or overcome any interoperability problem with the
Windows operating system. Furthermore, given the integrative efficiencies of bringing
two complementary products within the same firm,155 Microsoft's integrated product
could work much better than Sun or Novel's work group servers.
While the Commission’s decision was apparently based on its assessment of ex
post effects on innovation, it is arguably better understood as an attempt to protect the
incentives for collaboration, necessary to acquire knowledge that generates innovation.
Microsoft reaped benefits from its collaboration with Sun and Novel, as well as with
other firms whose products used the Windows system, for at least two reasons. First,
given that Microsoft was not producing its own work group server, having work group
servers that interoperate with Windows made Windows a more attractive operating
system and strengthened the indirect network externality. Such interoperation
strengthened the applications barrier to entry, enhancing the dominance of Windows, as
well as the value of Microsoft’s intellectual property in the operating system. Second,
information sharing between Microsoft and Sun or Novel in order to iron out problems
and ensure the interoperability of their work group servers with Windows generated
knowledge thatwould aid Microsoft in developing its own work group server.
Microsoft’s refusal to continue to ensure full interoperability to its rivals may be
condemned on fairness grounds, but beyond that, it can also stunt innovation by reducing
the incentives for firms such as Sun or Novell, or venture capital investors that support
such firms, to participate in similar collaborative relationships. Furthermore, if
Microsoft’s innovation is responsive or requires external sources of learning, the
153
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disincentive for collaboration arising from the power to unilaterally terminate such
relationships, dries up sources of learning and error-correction information, essential for
the development of improved and new products even by Microsoft itself. This produces
not only a static misallocation of resources, whereby resources shift away from those
products, but also leads to a loss in dynamic efficiency if it retards the rate of introduction
of new and improved products on the market.

(3) IMS
To illustrate the way in which the operation of the intellectual property laws can
stunt innovation by arbitrarily assigning ownership over a joint product resulting from a
collaborative effort to a single entity consider another European case, with far less
remarkable facts. In IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG,
the defendant IMS had copyright, under German law, in the "brick structure" that was
used for the presentation of regional sales data in the pharmaceutical industry.156 As the
European Court of Justice pointed out that, while IMS claimed the copyright, the brick
structure was developed through a collaborative work group, organized by IMS, with its
customers in the industry. The customers' supply of information and feedback to IMS
was a key factor in the development of the brick structure, which was relevant to the
question of whether IMS’s refusal to license the structure was abusive under the
competition laws.157 Furthermore, what gave the otherwise unremarkable brick structure
its value, was the decision by IMS’s customers to adopt it as the industry standard for the
presentation of marketing information “to which they adapted their production and
distribution systems.”158 IMS’s customers therefore had an important contribution and a
stake in the development of IMS’s intellectual property. The Court reasoned that if the
plaintiff, NDC, could introduce new features to the brick structure that the clients might
want or prefer, access to the brick structure to NDC should not be foreclosed by an
absolute view of IMS’s property right. To adopt such a view would provide a
disincentive for the customers to engage in the collaboration in the first place.
The Court's decision is based on the premise that NDC was seeking access to
IMS's copyrighted structure in order to build upon the brick structure which was the
industry standard by developing an improved product thatserved some of the customers'
needs. The Court noted that access to NDC could be granted only if “it intends to
produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there
156
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is a potential consumer demand.”159 Given this last requirement, it is not true to say that
European law is unambiguously more interventionist or more concerned with the
interests of competitors, rather than consumers.160 The IMS decision discourages mere
price competition with an identical product (in a way which might be permissible under
the U.S. essential facilities doctrine,161 to the extent it survives Trinko), and instead
promotes competition through innovation to build on a product in which the customers
have an important stake.

V. Antitrust mechanisms for governance
If collaboration is essential for the new firm to be able to innovate, an antitrust
policy that promotes innovation would need to provide mechanisms for managing
continuing cooperation. However, traditionally antitrust has not been viewed as a tool
that fosters inter-firm collaboration. Antitrust law is ordinarily deeply suspicious of firms
coordinating their decision-making. This suspicion can be traced back to Adam Smith's
comment that "people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some
contrivance to raise prices."162 Smith did not think that there was anything the law could
do to prevent such "meetings," but he also suggested that the law should do nothing to
encourage or facilitate them either.163 This view reflected Smith's more general
disapproval of any form of integration (including modern corporations) which restricted
the freedom of the "workman" or "tradesman" and the discipline that competition
imposed on thempersonally .164 Needless to say, this position no longer reflects the
realties of industrial organization in the modern economy. The need for collaboration
among loosely linked firms, as a form of innovative problem-solving, is a response to the
turbulence of the underlying environment in which the new organization operates. To
understand the role that antitrust can play in advancing such collaborations, we must
understand both the problems that are likely to beset such team relationships, and the
weaknesses of alternative instruments for resolving those problems.
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A. Problems in team production
Collaboration among different individual units in a problem-solving team makes
it possible for individual team members to specialize, which generates both productive
efficiencies and governance problems. Specialization among different team members
generates positive externalities, increasing the marginal productivity of each member, so
that the total production of the entire team is more than the sum of the output that would
be produced by each member individually.165 However, the interdependencies among
team members lead to governance problems of at least three kinds: hidden action, hidden
information and bargaining difficulties. For example, a team member whose effort is
difficult to observe by others can free ride on the efforts of others. While this reduces the
total output produced by the team as a whole, it can increase the share of output (net of
the cost of effort) to the shirking member. Similarly, an individual team member can
strategically misinform other collaborators about a piece of data possessed only by that
member, again with the aim of increasing his or her share of the surplus produced in the
joint collaboration. These governance problems create ex post inefficiencies, as well as ex
ante disincentives to engage in team production in the first place.
The increased specialization that produces production efficiencies leads to an
"increased inability to see the other person's point of view" as well as a "decrease in the
likelihood that competitive market forces will solve coordination problems by ... the
neutral operation of the price mechanism" because specialized team members are not
easily substitutable.166 Ultimately, the team must also decide how to divide the jointly
generated surplus between different team members, and such bargaining can be both
prolonged and costly.167 If the parties have made relationship-specific investments that
cannot be used with other collaborators, indispensable team members can engage in
opportunistic hold-up of the negotiations. This can increase the transaction costs of
bargaining substantially and consume the entire surplus generated by the team, making
the collaboration ex post inefficient.168
Given its hierarchical and vertically integrated nature, the Chandlerian firm
emerged as the mechanism that resolved the problems of joint production.169 By
imposing hierarchical authority on team members who are brought within the
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organization, the firm eliminated the need for collective decision-makingand attenuated
governance problems: the managers of the firm apportion rewards to the subordinates
(eliminating the need for bargaining and the risk of hold-up), monitor their performance
and punish shirking, while also rewarding effort.170 Further, the manager sets the goals
for the firm, and decomposes complex tasks into simpler component tasks, establishing
rules for the subordinates to follow in day-to-day operations, thereby overcoming the
limits in knowledge, capacity and rationality of individual team members.171
This benign view of the productive efficiencies of vertical integration informed
the Chicago New Learning which was an effort to incorporate the insights about the
efficiency benefits of integration into antitrust doctrine. By contrast, the classic antitrust
thinking that found expression in the Warren court antitrust doctrines, was influenced by
earlier ideas about maintaining the freedom of individual producers, with market
competition as the only disciplining mechanism. This is why the doctrine was generally
inhospitable to contractual restraints on the freedom of individual traders,172 as well as
vertical mergers and other forms of inter-firm collaboration.173
Through integration and planning, the Chandlerian firm was particularly effective
at achieving production efficiencies in stable market environments where changes in the
patterns of demand, technology and competitive threats were gradual and predictable.
Even within stable environments however, the task of the managers in the hierarchy was
not a simple one. As Miller documents, managerial problems arise due to the inability of
managers to observe the level and cost of effort of subordinates, making it difficult to
ensure task compliance either through rules or through incentive schemes that align the
interests of principals and subordinates.174 Similarly, the Chandlerian firm was plagued
by bargaining problems, in the form of industrial conflict over the distribution of surplus
profits.175
Internal pressures within hierarchical organizations were exacerbated by external
changes to the environment in which such firms were operating. One external pressure
was increased volatility of the market environment, due to greater openness of once
protected domestic markets to international trade and related rapid changes in technology
and demand patterns. Such an unstable environment made it even more difficult for
managers to monitor subordinates, since outcomes were contingent on many external
170
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confounding factors, of which the manager cannot be aware in advance. In a turbulent
environment, firms cannot rely on executing plans as the main tool for decision-making
and organizing production, placing a premium on the ability of firms to operate flexibly,
be able to adjust to changes quickly, and innovate constantly. Therefore, the firm's goals
could not be limited to reducing the cost of producing and delivering a given product, but
instead the firm must develop a robust project-selection process, so as not to be left
behind by developments in the market.
The firm innovates by selecting and executing new goals, which, as already
explained does not depend only on the firm's incentives,176 but also its capacity to acquire
knowledge about the world so as to select and evaluate possible future projects.177 Since
no "single company has the full range of knowledge or expertise necessary for timely and
cost-efficient product innovation,"178 the firm must search for others already solving a
similar problem, or at least some component of that problem. As the ultimate aim is to
solve problems for which the firm does not already have an answer (or has not even
identified), the point of such a search is to divert attention from habits and routines within
the firm, generate information about the advantages and disadvantages of identified
possibilities, thereby limiting the search process and making it manageable.179
Three disciplines regularly used by firms in selecting and refining future
production goals include benchmarking, error detection and correction, as well as
simultaneous design. Benchmarking identifies the successful solutions by other firms
who are solving the same or similar problems in order to identify the set of best current,
or potential, designs. Error-detection, on the other hand, focuses on break downs in the
chains of activity that lead to current disruptions in production or product design. These
disciplines can define a space of design solutions that are similar, but in some ways also
better than, current solutions, while at the same time identifying potential collaborators in
delivering a new design to the market. Furthermore, such design-selection techniques are
176
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robust and "can be expected to produce workable answers in turbulent task
environments."180 By benchmarking, the firm surveys the field of possible design
solutions, some of which illuminate unforeseen problems and solutions and increase the
reliability of the ultimate product design.181 To this we might add that benchmarking and
error-detection could identify design alternatives that the firm decides not to pursue at
present, although such alternatives might become more suitable in the dramatically
different market conditions of tomorrow.
The design process is refined through iterated modification of the initial
specifications and this involves on-going consultation and contributions from
collaborators, namely the firms that supply either component parts or complementary
products. The process is iterated, since rapid shifts and unpredictable changes in the
market make it imprudent to commit excessively to one design version. Furthermore, the
collaborators must be involved in this process jointly, because changes in the
specifications or requirements that could improve the performance of one aspect of
product design will require incorporation and adjustments in the design of other
components.182 As Jorde and Teece point out, this process continues even after a product
is developed, produced and delivered to market.183 These practices are contingent upon
the existence of a standard or platform that supplies the language for collaboration, as
well as avoiding the governance problems, described earlier, that impede decentralized
team production in the absence of hierarchical authority.
On one view, a partial solution to the team governance problem is inherent in the
disciplines of innovation and product design already described. In particular, the
"collaborative processes for disciplined joint inquiry about how common projects can be
improved to mutual benefit,"184 also provide mechanisms that ensure the accountability
of other collaborators, precisely because they rely on rich mutual provision of
information. Such information provision attenuates the opportunities for collaborating
partners to shirk or to withhold relevant information, about their capabilities or about
their costs.185
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However, the provision of information necessary for joint development attenuates
some of the governance problems of team production, it exacerbates others. In particular,
such information sharing makes collaborators particularly vulnerable, because one firm
may be tempted to appropriate the fruits of the joint exploration and innovation. In
addition, in case of a break-down in the relationship, one firm could inhibit the capacity
of its collaborators to innovate. Furthermore, antitrust lawyers have always recognized
that information sharing among competitorsor potential competitors makes it easier for
them to coordinate their decisions at the expense of third parties, such as consumers or
other entrants.
The remainder of this section examines a number of alternative mechanisms that
could be used for the governance of innovative collaborations, including contracts,
intellectual property, and incentive compatible mechanisms. For a number of reasons
none of the above mechanisms provides an adequate response, leaving open the space for
antitrust to fulfill this role. After all, antitrust is a tool for moderating inter-firm
relationships. However, as will be seen, the antitrust mechanisms that are effective in
these contexts do not rely on the traditional antitrust remedies, including ex post awards
of treble damages, or the imposition of unqualified duties to deal with collaborators. The
prospect of such remedies only escalates threats of opportunistic hold up. As the antitrust
disputes described in the prior section illustrate, once a collaboration break-down results
in litigation, firms can assert overlapping claims of breaches of contractual, intellectual
property rights, as well as the antitrust laws. In this context, standard antitrust and
intellectual property remedies simply exacerbate the incentives for opportunistic conduct.
Relying on the usual armory of debilitating remedies under the intellectual property and
antitrust regimes enhances the credibility of the threat to walk-out from the negotiations.
Doing so credibly, enables a party to claim a greaterportion of the surplus in any
settlement negotiations and therefore, provides an ex ante disincentive for collaboration.

B. Contracts, standards and incentive-compatible mechanisms
(1) Governance through contracting
Contracts among collaborating firms cannot provide an effective solution to the
governance problems likely to arise. The modern collaborative relationships involve a
much deeper level of involvement between the firms than was present under traditional
arms-length contracting. The firms are not simply trading widgets used in the production
process. Through the disciplines for innovation described earlier, they are jointly making
sense of the problem presented and designing a solution. Furthermore, neither the
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outcomes of the process of mutual exploration, nor the range of future states of the
market are either ex ante certain or predictable enough to make future duties or actions of
the parties susceptible to specification through contractual rules.186 In other words, the
parties' investments in the collaboration are not contractible.A fter all, a fully specified
contract to govern such a relationship would be nothing but a plan, and as already shown,
planning does not supply an adequate paradigm for the nature and purpose of these
collaborative relationships.
Nor does it help to characterize such close collaborations as relational contracts,
as this simply restates the problem, rather than providing a solution. Presciently, Robert
Scott has observed that "[w]e are all relationists now."187 To characterize a contract as
relational simply acknowledges the existence of contractibility problems in a relationship,
making it impossible to specifycontractual rules that identify the parties' future duties
and obligations. As a consequence, parties will avoid specifying details and instead will
need to rely on some other mechanism to resolve the contracting problem, though it is not
obvious what that mechanism would be. For example, purely informal, reputation based
mechanisms can control opportunistic conduct in small groups with limited and stable
memberships. In such settings, the existing mutual bonds oftrust and community create
a credible threat of punishment by the community for non-cooperative opportunistic
conduct by individuals (for example through exclusion from and ostracism) even in the
absence of rules.188 Such is not the environment where potential collaborators are
numerous and diverse, where they may originate in different parts of the world and where
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the industry turn-over is high, or where some firms have a disproportionate power to
make credible threats compared to others.
The classic relational contract arose in the very different context of long-standing
relationships among parties locked into mutual collaboration due to their geographic
proximity, or because their assets and investments are specific to the relationship and
have no value outside it. Such a relationship foreclosed outside options for the
collaborating firms, making it necessary to rely on other mechanisms to resolvedisputes
as they arose. Standard mechanisms for dispute resolution in relational contracts, such as
the use of formulae to determine mutual prices or "split-the-difference" arbitration are
unlikely to be suitable in environments where key inputs to production and innovation
process are not physical, and where the assumptions about the world that are ordinarily
embodied in such formulae are constantly changing. Furthermore, in contemporary
industries, assets are increasingly de-specified, reducing the classic lock- in effects among
firms. Instead, firms collaborate in order to engage in mutual learning and problemsolving, which involves extensive sharing of information, leaving them exposed to the
possibility of opportunistic exploitation only heightened by the fact that assets are not
specific to the relationship.

(2) Modular relationships
Modular production relationships enable decentralized firms to engage in the
production of mutually compatible products, while minimizing the amount of intimate
information firms must supply to other firms in order to mimic market exchange.
According to one view of modern decentralized production, Langlois suggests that the
post-Chandlerian landscape is dominated by modularized production approximating
arms-length relationships where "differentiated exchanges are underpinned by a set of
market-supporting institutions, notably standard interfaces or design rules."189
Standardization of interfaces ensures inter-firm coordination, allowing firms to innovate
within their own sphere, but at the same time it reduces the need for firms to share a great
deal of intimate information. According to Langlois, firms "arise as islands of nonmodularity in a sea of modularity.”190 In a modular production model, individual firms
are focused on innovating within their own field (produce their unit) and modules can be
189
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produced in high volumes and re-combined in novel ways so as to satisfy consumer
demand.
However, modular production relationships also rigidify unit boundaries leading
to the so-called "modularity trap" where the range of possible productive innovations is
limited by the overall design framework,191 (if we assume the existence of an unchanging
optimal partition of tasks). Langlois himself recognizes that with rigid boundaries
between units, modular systems cannot deal adequately with dynamic learning and
unpredictable novelty.192 Sabel and Zeitlin point out thateven in the electronics sector
(often seen as the paradigm), pure modularity is not observed.193 Further, modular
systems generally underperform in industries where they compete with non -modular
ones, since firms have to outlay substantial investments to adjust their production to the
modular architecture, and modular producers are locked into an irreversible commitment
to a product architecture that may turn out to be unsuccessful.194
Furthermore, the "market-supporting institutions" that develop interfaces and
design rules for collaboration raise institutional problems of their own. This function is
ordinarily assigned to trade associations or standard-setting organizations. In setting
standards and design rules, such bodies must obtain information from their members, but
they do not necessarily have the mechanisms to align the individual interests of their
members either with the interests of the collective or the public interest. The problem of
joint opportunism of association members who use the standard-setting process as a mask
for collusion or collusive exclusion of other competitors is well -known to antitrust
lawyers.195 Moreover, where the standard is used to block entry of competitors, it is
difficult for an antitrust court to resolve such cases by merely enforcing a set of
procedural rules and without arbitrating the question of the more appropriate standard or
design architecture.
In a similar vein, individual members of a trade or standard association have an
incentive to subvert the standard-setting process through strategic provision or
withholding of information, in order to influence the adoption of a (sometimes
suboptimal) standard that favours the interests of that member. For example, in a number
191
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of recent cases, the antitrust authorities have intervened in order to ensure the fidelity of
information about patent ownership thata member provides in the proceedings of a
standard-setting body.196 While trade associations are often governed by rules, such
associations are not hierarchical and therefore cannot impose a solution. Exclusion from
the standard-setting process is the only real sanction they can impose for breaches of the
rules, yet such a threat may not be credible against certain crucial players.
Furthermore, where the modular platform is privately owned, and perhaps
ubiquitous due to strong network externality effects, the rigid modular design architecture
presents particular problems from an antitrust perspective. If the platform owner pursues
a modular structure, other firms focused on developing their own modules will be
effective in linking to the incumbent platform, but "will lack the knowledge to envision
how to connect to a new architecture,"197 thereby limiting possibilities for system level
learning and disruption of the incumbent's ubiquity.198 In such a scenario, the modularity
trap resulting from a rigid architecture may actually protect the platform owner's
monopoly profits. Not only do individual module producers lack knowledge to disrupt
the existing architecture, but the platform owner acquires knowledge from collaborating
with downstream firms and, given the leverage afforded by the ubiquity of the platform,
can easily integrate into vertically related markets.

(3) Incentive-compatible solutions
In a thoughtful analysis of the foregoing problem, Farrell and Weiser examine the
platform monopolist's private choice to either maintain a modular market structure or
integrate into adjacent product markets in order to determine whether this private
decision is consistent with the market architecture that best promotes the public
interest.199 They argue that from the antitrust policy point of view neither modularity, nor
vertical integration provides a safe harbor rule applicableacross all markets. In addition,
the antitrust decision-maker cannot decide that one architecture is unambiguously better
than the other in a particular market, since in every industry there will be benefits from
both integration and independence. However, if the profit-maximizing solution of the
platform owner is consistent with the social optimum, this would also support a noninterventionist antitrust policy.
196
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In Farrell and Weiser's the platform owner chooses between a modular
architecture or downstream integration. Modularity promotes innovation because of the
independence that it fosters between business firms: "Modular industry structures enable
independent firms to introduce innovations into an established environment. An open
architecture can facilitate innovation in individual components, spur market entry, and
result in lower prices."200 The platform monopolist also benefits if a modular
downstream structure fosters innovation in the applications market, because this increases
the attractiveness and the value of the platform. However, if the platform owner
integrates into downstream markets, this results in transaction costs efficiencies
benefiting both the platform monopolist and the pubic. Such efficiencies include
minimizing the risk of downstream holdup, avoiding double marginalization, resolving
coordination problems among collaborators, ensuring better interoperability between
products, and enhancing the monopolist's ability to alter platform interfaces in order to
evolve the platform.201
Invoking a variant of the Chicago school single monopoly profit argument, Farrell
and Weiser point out that the monopolist has an incentive to promote an efficient market
structure in the downstream market. Not only does the monopolist not increase its profit
by leveraging itself into the downstream market (since it could always charge a higher
price for the platform), but in fact it also gains from an efficient downstream market that
promotes downstream innovation, which enhances the value of its own platform for
consumers, and therefore the price it can receive.
However, they go on to caution that this argument does not necessarily support a
non-interventionist antitrust policy towards a ubiquitous platform monopolist. This is
because the logic of internalizing complementary efficiencies ("ICE") can break down for
a number of reasons, which give the platform monopolist inefficient incentives to
integrate into the downstream market. They identify at least eight reasons forbreakdown ,
including cases where the upstream price is regulated, so the monopoly profit can be
derived from monopolizing the downstream market,202 bargaining failures (between the
monopolist and a downstream market participant), the monopolist's fear that a
downstream application could develop into potential competition to the platform, and

200

Id. at 95.
Id. at 97-99.
202
Even if the monopolist is not currently regulated in the upstream market it might wish to charge a
lower price there and get some of the monopoly profits in downstream markets precisely in order to avoid
regulation in the upstream market.
201

ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE

51

also, perhaps surprisingly, the incompetence of the incumbent (whereby either the
incumbent or at least some of its employees do not appreciate203 the logic of ICE).204
By contrast to Farrell and Weiser's model where the monopolist (or the policymaker) chooses from two alternatives for the downstream market structure (modularity or
integration), the model of innovation outlined in this Article is more general. The
innovation practices described earlier suggest that for joint problem solving to succeed
and be robust, the collaborators must be "loosely coupled."205 This implies that
collaborators must be intimate enough to learn from nuance, but at the same time
sufficiently detached in order to be able to break with convention and the habits of the
group.206 Thus, inter-firm relations need sufficient proximity to benefit from
complementarities and mutual learning, while avoiding integration in ways that come to
resemble a hierarchy.
Not only may pure modularity be undesirable as a model of inter-firm
relationships for the reasons identified earlier,207 but such a structure may be impossible
in the technology markets, particularly where the platform is owned by a privateentity . A
purely modular market structure would approximate arms-length relationships, with
minimal information exchange between the platform supplier and downstream market
suppliers. However, given the need for applications at the two levels to be able to
interoperate, to coordinate the introduction of new products at both levels sequentially
and to provide feedback in both directions about the robustness of designs (including the
interfaces) before products can be delivered to market, it seems difficult to even conceive
of purely modular relationships.
Once we recognize that in order to produce robust product and systems designs,
firms must engage in deeper forms of collaboration than those implied by pure
modularity, the factors identified by Farrell and Weiser thatundermine the "logic of ICE"
become even more salient. In particular, the rich sharing of information in order to
engage in collaborative innovation elevates the risks of opportunism, and heightens the
possibility of inefficient incentives for integration. For example, the platform maker
might learn sufficiently from the relationship to enable it to integrate in the downstream
market and eliminate the value of the investments of the downstream collaborators, or
203
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conversely, that the downstream collaborators will be able to create products which are a
substitute for the platform of the monopolist. The risks of ex post opportunism could also
lead to bargaining failures.
Finally, Farrell and Weiser's observation about the "incompetence" of the
incumbent becomes more important and is generalizable. The incumbent (or its
management) may in fact realize the logic of ICE, yet they might not know precisely
what would be the structure of an efficient downstream market , particularly in a dynamic
underlying environment. Uncertainties about the future regulatory and competitive
environment, together with the possibility that downstream suppliers may commoditize
its platform by learning from the collaboration, are alladditionalreasons for inefficient
downstream integration, which create further doubts that the platform monopolist would
be a good steward of the downstream market through its own unilateral decisions.

C. Property rights in innovation
The courts' growing emphasis on strong intellectual property protection to
preserve the incentives for innovation by corporations, in preference to ex post antitrust
duties, is also not an adequate solution to the governance problems in inter-firm
collaborations identified earlier. If the contributions of individual firms to a common
innovative venture or design could be clearly delineated and protected by the grant of a
property right (such as a patent or copyright208), this would have a number of beneficial
consequences. First, and most importantly, the delineation of boundaries would attenuate
the collaborators' concern that one of them could appropriate the fruits of the mutual
collaboration. Secondly, clear assignment of property rights can lead to efficient
outcomes from Coasian bargaining and, in fact, if the individual contributions to the joint
product are clearly identified, this may also reduce the costs of bargaining. Finally,
consonant with the traditional understanding of the rationale for intellectual property, the
right to exclusivity of appropriation provides incentives for each collaborator to invest in
that component of the collaboration over which it has residual control.
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(1) Practical and conceptual problems
The practical limitations of the intellectual property regime as a solution to the
governance problems in team production stem from the fact that the patent and copyright
systems emerged against the background of very different processes of discovery and
creation, which were more suited to stable environments rather than the practices of rapid
and on-going innovation described earlier in the Article. A key limitation stems from the
fact that both copyrights and patents rely on judicial action for ex post enforcement.
Furthermore, the process of granting the property right ex antefor both copyright s and
patents also presents problems. A copyright, for instance, subsists in the final
embodiment of the creation, and no attempt is made to distinguish the contributions of
different collaborators towards the final product at the point when the right is created.
The grant of a patent depends on hierarchical action — namely, an administrative process
before the Patents and Trademarks Office assessing the innovative contribution of the
patent application — which presents a set of institutional questions.
The institutional infirmities of the intellectual property regime, and particularly
the patenting system, have been the topic of extensive academic and policy scrutiny.209
That criticism focuses on the limits of the patent examination process, including the time
and resources available to examiners, which makes a detailed and careful assessment of
the merits of each individual patent application impossible. This is seen as one of the key
reasons for the dramatic increase in the proliferation of patents in recent years.210 An
even more important limitation, particularly if intellectual property rights are to provide a
solution of the governance problem in inter-firm collaborations, is the process by which
the patent examiner acquires knowledge in order to process the patent application. Patent
applications are submitted by an applicant who claims to be the inventor, and the novelty
and inventiveness of the applicant's contribution are decided in an administrative
conversation between the patent examiner and the applicant, by reference to the prior art
and prior use.211 Importantly, other claimants do not take part in this process, and the
purpose of patent examination is not to identify and allocate the contributions of different
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collaborators to the claimed invention.212 Once a patent issues, it is presumed valid213
and any further disputes about either the validity or infringement of a patent are decided
in court, where judges are at an even more significant information disadvantage.214
These features of the process, together with the armament of remedies that exist under the
intellectual property laws, allow firms to use patenting defensively and strategically,
increasing the cost of bringing novel technology to the market in a world where the
number of patent grants has grown exponentially.215
The practical limitations of the intellectual property solution to the governance of
collaborations cannot be overcome by adjustments in the patenting regime because the
property based solution to the governance problem is also conceptually unsound. The
conceptual reasons are similar to those that led to doubt the effectiveness of contract or
modularity as governance mechanisms. Collaborative relationships, in part, overcome the
limits of individual rationality and imagination through the mutual "sense-making" in an
increasingly complex and fast-moving world. To the extent that this process is more akin
to a conversation or deliberation,216 it is doubtful whether the outcomes of such process
can be represented in a way that satisfactorily allocates the individual contributions of the
collaborators. Any attempt to do so ex ante, or in the course of product design and
development, will slow both the patenting and the innovation process to a halt. As
Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel explain, in the deeply collaborative relationships in the
automotive industry, even the residual control over physical assets is not clearly
delineated in a way that would resolve the team governance problem to provide an
effective protection from appropriation.217
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(2) The FTC's "romantic" view of patents and pragmatic view of remedies
The F.T.C.'s complaint against Intel illustrates both some of the problems
identified above and one possible way of mediating the excesses of the antitrust and IP
regimes.218 The FTC challenged Intel's resort to self-help in the patent disputes with its
collaborators, arguing that those patent disputes were better decided in court. Carl
Shapiro criticizesthe FTC's position as being based on a "romantic" view of patents.219
Arguing that litigation was the more appropriate forum in which to resolve the patent
disputes is particularly difficult to defend, given that patent litigation is notoriously long
and expensive, and trial judges are ordinarily reluctant to try patent cases that involve
evaluation of copious and complex scientific and technical evidence.220 However, the
remedy implemented by the consent decree with Intel reflects an understanding of the
role of collaboration in promoting innovation, the forces that can undermine such
collaboration, as well as the ways in which traditional patent and antitrust remedies
heighten the incentives for opportunistic conduct.
In what was essentially a bargaining dispute within a collaborative relationship,221
the FTC’s consent decree can be viewed as an instrument promoting a negotiated
solution, which preserves the incentives of the parties to continue their collaboration. It
achieved this by eliminating the most debilitating remedies that the parties could rely
upon if they litigated the dispute, either from the antitrust or intellectual property armory
of remedies.222 Thus, the complaining firms gave up the right to seek treble damages
under the antitrust laws.223 Further, the consent decree provided that the complaining
firms would not seek an injunction which would shut down Intel’s operations as a remedy
in the patent litigation. Intel, on the other hand, gave up its right of self-help against the
complaining firms, namely to stop providing advance technical information, which would
retard their ability to innovate. If firms in the position of the complainants fear that the
contributions they bring to the relationship and joint innovation could easily be
appropriated by Intel, this would be a disincentive for such firms to invest in the
collaboration.224 Similarly, Intel as the platform owner would be reluctant to engage in
218
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closer collaboration with other firms, if this results in an ex post duty to continue to
collaborate even in the face of opportunistic conduct by downstream firms.
By eliminating the most extreme litigation options that would give the parties
reasons for hold-out,225 the FTC consent decree increased the likelihood that the disputes
in the collaborative relationship could be resolved.226 Therefore, the possibility of a long
and protracted patent litigation, in which a court would reach a one-sided and perhaps
arbitrary decision, could be viewed as the penalty that the parties would have to incur if
they did not reach a negotiated resolution to their disputes.227

(3) "Dilution" of IP rights
The discussion in this section illustrates the problems with the ascendant view that
strict protection of intellectual property rights is an essential precondition to provide
incentives for firms to invest in innovative ventures and that the ex post imposition of
antitrust duties on the successful innovator dilutes those incentives. For instance, Elhauge
has criticized courts (and scholars) who advocate imposing antitrust duties on a patent
owner based on a case-by-case assessment of the effect of such duties on the innovation
incentives in the industry:
[B]oth [Scherer's] theory and evidence are purely ex post.
They cannot tell us whether, if these firms had realized the
law would impose this risk of compulsory patent licensing,
they would have had sufficient ex ante incentives to create
the initial inventions ...228

In words that resonate with the Trinko decision, Elhauge argues that "the prospect of
future monopoly profits is necessary to encourage ex ante innovation and investment to
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create that monopoly power."229 And further, even in cases where the patent monopoly
was created improperly230
Forced sharing of the improperly created monopoly does
not remedy the past mistakes. Rather, it worsens them by
undermining not only the monopolist's incentives to
maintain and enhance the value of the property that gives it
monopoly power but also rival incentives to duplicate the
functional benefits of that property. And it creates
enormous administrative difficulties by requiring antitrust
judges and juries to set the reasonable price for access, a
task rendered only more difficult by the fact that optimal
prices will continually vary over time with changing market
conditions, but will end up being assessed retrospectively
by antitrust tribunals after years of adversary proceedings,
with any wrong guess being punished by treble damages.231
However, the evidence that the simultaneous model of joint problem-solving has
decided advantages in high technology industries suggests caution about viewing rights
in intellectual property in such absolute terms, as if they have resulted from dedicated
unilateral research efforts of a single enterprise. A firm operating in turbulent market
conditions may neither have capacity nor the incentive to invest in such a research effort.
Yet a manufacturer or software developer cannot afford not to innovate because market
conditions are constantly changing and failure to keep pace would be disastrous. The
tendency towards experiential and on-going innovation practices, based on provisional
designs and iterated solutions, arises precisely because it is risky for the firm to invest too
much in research which is contingent on a particular future state. Further, product or
process developments that are protected as intellectual property can be the result of
learning and sharing of information that draws from other actors involved in the
production process. A firm depends upon the information supplied by users about
problems they have encountered, or feedback from vertically related firms in order to fix
problems with their own product, and such information can be used for strategic or
opportunistic purposes.
Dominant firms that have a gate-keeping function, particularly in industries with
strong indirect network effects, benefit significantly from their collaboration with other
firms. Such collaboration enhances the value of the network, the barriers to entry that
prevent a challenge to the dominant firm, and the value of intellectual property.
However, such firms also have a disproportionate power to force a resolution of any
229
230
231

Id. at 298 (original emphasis).
Or one could add, provided by the government or through governmental subsidies or protection.
Elhauge, supra n.XX at 308.

ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE

58

emerging dispute in their own favor. An untrammeled right to refuse to continue to
cooperate (even in the absence of any ex post effects on consumers in the market or
product under scrutiny), reduces the ex ante incentives for other firms to participate and
invest in collaborative efforts or the incentives of venture capitalists to finance such firms
who would be subject to significant hold-out costs from a termination of the
collaboration.

D. Antitrust governance

The advancement of innovation in modern marketsrequires collaborative modes
of production among decentralized production units, in a way which charts a path
between purely arms-length or modular relationships (which are either impossible or
undesirable given the nature of production) and hierarchical relationships (which allow
for integrative efficiencies and aim to control the opportunism of subordinate units, but
also stifle inventive learning). While the governance mechanisms discussed above show
limited promise of success, the classic antitrust remedies are similarly constrained. The
solution to the governance problem does not lie in damage payments for the violation of a
given rule. Indeed, if ex ante rules could adequately resolve the governance problem, the
parties may have generated those rules themselves. Nor does the solution lie in
reallocation of property rights, such as a duty to deal, which would not adequately control
for collaborator opportunism or take into account possibilities of integrative
efficiencies.232 And yet any more nuanced or substantive remedy would tend towards a
particularly undesirable form of hierarchical intervention: a legal or administrative
solution to problems of product design.
However, some more recently implemented antitrust remedies demonstrate
sensitivity to the problems identified so far, and develop governance mechanisms for the
on-going cooperation in the industry. Such mechanisms are not based on rigid rules or
arbitration, but instead on institutions which might promote learning about the industry,
while resolving disputes among collaborators. The remedies evaluated in the remainder
of the Article stem from litigation against Microsoft, including the main U.S. litigation by
the DoJ together with the Attorneys General of 20 states, and the European Commission's
decision that Microsoft had violated EU competition law. The focus is on thefeatures
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incorporated in the design of these mechanisms to generate knowledge through
monitoring inter-firm relationships, but also to ensure accountability of the new
implementation bodies.

(1) Schumpeterian Competition or Evolving the Platform
The government's prosecution of Microsoft was based on its practices directed at
so called "middleware" applications such as the Netscape Browser and the Java Virtual
Machine. Microsoft implemented a number of strategies, through its relationships with
other firms in the industry, in order to prevent the growth of middleware applications.
Those strategies were motivated by Microsoft's fear that, because middleware
applications expose their own APIs (and therefore applications can be written for
middleware), they could replace or commoditize the Windows operating system.
Microsoft attempted to forestall the growth of middleware applications not only by
developing its own alternative products, such as the Internet Explorer browser, but also
integrating them into the Windows platform.
Further, Microsoft instituted a set of exclusive contracting practices with
downstream suppliers, such as computer equipment manufacturers, other platform
suppliers (Apple) as well as software applications suppliers requiring downstream
suppliers not to support Netscape's browser, as a condition for Microsoft's continued
cooperation. Given the overwhelming dominance of Windows in the operating systems
market, as well as of Microsoft Office in basic software applications, Microsoft could
impose such conditions. Microsoft went further and by invoking its intellectual property
rights, dictated some of the micro details of the way in which the computer equipment
manufacturers would configure their personal computers, including the appearance of the
desktop after the initial start up of the system.233
By the time the case reached the D.C. Circuit, the government's claim was based
on a monopoly maintenance theory under section 2 of the Sherman Act.234 In particular,
the government claimed that through its practices directed at Netscape and Java,
Microsoft was aiming to protect its operating system monopoly by extinguishing the
threat that the middleware applications could undermine or replace the ubiquitous
Windows operating system. Modern antitrust analysis requires the likelihood of
anticompetitive effects to be demonstrated before a finding of liability, which in this case
required proof both that the targeted middleware applications could pose an alternative to
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the operating system and that extinguishing those applications strengthened Microsoft's
market power. Yet the record did not demonstrate that either Netscape or Java were
anywhere near a point where they could expose sufficient APIs for applications to be
written, let alone up to a stage where they could offer a viable alternative to the Windows
operating system.235
According to Bresnahan, the underlying theory of the U.S. case against Microsoft
was based on a Schumpeterian236 view of competition in the market for platform
software, as opposed to, for instance, a natural monopoly theory. Given the strong
network effects and increasing returns to scale in the supply of the operating system,
firms compete to capture the field or the entire market.237 Microsoft's use of its leverage
to impose a number of contractual restrictions was aimed at forestalling innovation that
would, in turn, extinguish emergent competitors for the field, thereby impeding the
mechanisms of Schumpeterian competition in their nascence.
However, in light of the model of collaborative innovation outlined earlier in the
Article, it is possible to engage in a degree of revisionism and provide a somewhat
different interpretation of that case as well as its progeny. Microsoft's ability to use its
leverage to impose contractual restraints on various firms operating in related markets
impeded the possibilities for collaboration among such firms, even though this
collaboration would result in successful problem-solving innovations that Microsoft
might not have been able to develop itself. Thus, such collaborations enhanced the value
of Microsoft's platform. Effectively, Microsoft's conduct was an attempt to impose a
hierarchical structure on inter-firm relationships in the products related to the operating
system. In such a structure Microsoft would be primarily responsible for the selection of
goals and innovation projects, while other firms were largely delegated the task of
implementing decisions and engaging in limited innovation, within those spheres left
open by Microsoft.238
Irrespective of the fact that Microsoft's effort and acumen may have produced its
leading position as an operating system, this quasi-hierarchical market structure would
retard innovation because it would impede both independent creativity and disruptive
innovation. While this might, over time, have reduced the value of Microsoft's platform
235

The Court overcame this hurdle by claiming that where the suit is brought by the government, the
court would not require a strong establishment of causation.
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See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1976) (process of
creative destruction, where a creative new solution undermines the dominance of the previous one).
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Bresnahan, supra n.XX.
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The similarity of this form of inter-firm relationships to a modular market structure is quite
striking, with the exception that the hierarchical model might in fact be better because it does not face the
problem of collective action in any effort to evolve the platform and the system as a whole.
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making it more vulnerable to a challenger, such a challenge might occur too far in the
long run and would be uncertain, given that, if unchecked, Microsoft had the ability to
scuttle (or appease) potential challengers early on. Thus, rather that enabling
Schumpeterian competition, the government's case is more appropriately seen to promote
"evolutionary" competition. Preventing Microsoft from imposing the contractual
restraints on collaboration would improve the level of innovation within Microsoft's
platform, also enabling Microsoft to better realize its own self-interest, rather than relying
on the uncertain future threat of a Schumpeterian rival as a disciplining mechanism.239
The remedial mechanisms in the Microsoft cases provide further support for this view.

(2) Microsoft remedies
(a) DoJ negotiated decree
Following the decision of the D.C. Circuit, the DoJ, under a new administration
and with the agreement of nine of the prosecuting states, decided not to litigate the
remanded liability questions or to seek a judicial remedial decree from the District Court,
but instead settled the case through a remedial decree negotiated with Microsoft. The
negotiated remedial decree has received two principal criticisms. For some, the decree
was a result of the unwillingness of the DoJ, under a new administration, to prosecute the
case to its end. By not seeking a more far ranging remedy (particularly by contrast to the
structural break up that had been originally requested and ordered by Judge Jackson) the
DoJ, in effect, gave away its appellate victory.240 For others, the key problem was that
the negotiated decree did not provide a one-off antitrust remedy. Instead, the decree
isolated forms of conduct condemned by the court's decision and imposed restrictions on
such conduct, together with a mechanism for on-going supervision and monitoring of
Microsoft's compliance, which, on this view, produced unnecessary costs, burdens and
uncertainty.
However, the quasi-regulatory remedy was simply the result of the complexity of
the problems presented by the case. Given the dynamic nature of the technology, a oneoff injunctive decree (i.e., a list of "don'ts") could not have provided an effective remedy
as much as a recipe on how to effectively evade the letter of the injunction.241 Further,
239

The fact that such a rival does not appear to have emerged thus far, and the fact that Microsoft has
in fact turned many of its antitrust foes into collaborators is further evidence that this would have been a
good strategy. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Antitrust Suit Turns Into A Partnership For Microsoft, N.Y. Times,
October 15, 2005, (partnership between Microsoft and RealNetworks, one of the antitrust complainants
both in the U.S. and Europe to develop an open alternative in the digital media market).
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See, e.g., Fox, supra n.115 at 93-96, 110; Timothy F. Bresnahan, A Remedy That Falls Short of
Restoring Competition, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, 67.
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The experience with the original Microsoft consent decree only confirms this view.
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even if it were possible to devise an effective behavioral remedybased on simple
injunctive rules, such a remedy would not be self-executing and would require some form
of supervision and monitoring. Even a structural break-up of the company, which is an
apparently one-off surgical remedy, would involve the court — or some other entity — in
on-going resolution of a mire of difficult and intractable problems because it requires
specification of a host of further micro-level details about the activities, staffing, future
integration and collaboration among the newly separate entities.
Instead, the remedial mechanism in the decree was not hierarchical and did not
involve the Court in daily operations of the company, nor did it place all implementation
functions with one body.242 The process of monitoring Microsoft's conduct and resolving
questions and disputes that would emerge in the course of implementation was more
diffuse, through four principal channels. These channels are mutually supportive and
encourage mutual learning for all actors involved, including Microsoft as the regulated
entity.
The first, "peer evaluation," channelentrusts the primary supervisory
responsibility for the implementation with a court appointed technical committee of
experts243 in software design and programming.244 The primary function of the
committee is to monitor Microsoft’s compliance with the decree, receive complaints and
relay those complaints to an internal compliance unit established within Microsoft (the
"internal self-evaluation" channel).245 Microsoft's internal compliance unit coordinates
the company's efforts to comply with the decree and educates Microsoft employees about
the requirements of the decree and the antitrust laws more generally.246 Further, the
decree left a large degree of autonomy to Microsoft to devise its compliance strategy and
its response to any complaints forwarded through the technical committee.247
The third channel of implementation (the "reporting channel") is based on a
process of joint status reporting of both strategiesadopted and outcomes achieved. Joint
242

This is in stark contrast to the AT&T remedial decree, where the Court was at the center of the
implementation and adjustment of the remedial decree which ultimately restructured the entire
telecommunications industry. The original DoJ action against AT&T that lead to a consent decree
settlement was in 1949. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas (CCH) ¶ 68,246 (D.N.J. Jan.
24, 1956). The main case against AT&T was in 1974, and was also settled with a consent decree after
Judge Greene denied summary judgment for AT&T. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1982), a decree which governed the telecommunications industry until the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act in 1996.
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Status Reports are regularlyproduced by Microsoft and the Department of Justice and
those reports describe and evaluate Microsoft’s compliance with the remedy decree. The
reports focus on the extent to which the steps and measures undertaken by Microsoft have
achieved the goals pursued by the decree, and propose alternative measures where a
particular problem is seen to persist.248 The final channel (the "reserve (or penalty)
channel") is vested in the court by Judge Kollar Kottely's decision to reserve the district
court's jurisdiction to revisitthe decree, should it determine that Microsoft's compliance
is unsatisfactory.249
(b) The non-settling states' proposal
While the District Court approved the decree negotiated by the DoJ, Judge Kollar
Kottely refused to implement an alternative remedy according to the request of nine
states, which disagreed with the DoJ approach. The non-settling states continued with
the litigation and argued that the District Court should impose an alternative remedy in
line with the D.C. Circuit's findings of liability. The courtheld that, as a general
proposition, the imposition of a two track remedy would be too onerous for Microsoft.
Further, it specificallyrejected all of the proposals for alternative mechanisms proposed
by the non-settling states and their independent expert witnesses.
The non-settling states were strongly opposed to the technical committee, as
proposed in the DoJ decree, and asked instead for the court to appoint a special master
and a special committee of independent directors within Microsoft. While refusing to
appoint a special master to oversee the implementation, the Court agreed to the states'
request for a special committee of independent directors on Microsoft's board and an
internal compliance officer with a more independent status within Microsoft:250
[T]he compliance officer position proposed by [the nonsettling states] is appointed by a committee comprised of at
least three members of the Microsoft board of directors
who are neither present, nor former, Microsoft employees.
The compliance officer in Plaintiffs' proposal is protected
against abrupt termination by a provision which permits
removal only by the Chief Executive Officer of Microsoft
248

See Joint Status Report of January 2004.
Judge Kollar-Kottelly declined any limits on the court's jurisdiction to intervene in the matter.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 200 (D.D.C. 2002). Not only can the parties apply
for further orders, but the Court can "sua sponte" issue orders and directions. Id. at 201. See also Cohen,
supra n.XX, at 344.
250
New York v. Microsoft, 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 182-183 (D.D.C. 2002). The internal compliance
officer was also to report to the plaintiff states.
249

ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE

64

with the concurrence of the committee that appointed the
officer. The compliance officer reports to the Chief
Executive Officer and to the committee which appointed
him or her.
In another significant rebuff to the remedy proposal of the non-settling states, the Court
also refused to allow third parties to have direct access to the remedy implementation
mechanism in order to make complaints about Microsoft's conduct and allege violations
of the remedial decree.
Although the non-settling states did not persuade the Court to impose a different
substantive remedy, their intervention served the useful purposeof allowing the Court to
compare the decree negotiated by the DoJ to a specific alternative proposal. This made it
necessary for the Court to articulate reasons for rejecting their alternative proposals. In
the ordinary course of approving settlement decrees negotiated by the DoJ, a court is
presented with an already finalized proposed decree which it must assess pursuant to the
Tunney Act.251 In the Tunney Act, Congress empowered Courts to examine antitrust
settlement decrees with limited Congressional guidance: before approving and entering
the decree, the court had to be satisfied that the degree was in the "public interest."252
While this gives the court a potentially broad mandate, review is constrained by limits on
judicial capacity to perform a searching review, particularly since the judge performing
such review, is largely dependent on information supplied by the settling parties. Even
though the Tunney Act allows third parties to provide comments on the proposed decree,
such comments can be either insufficient,253 or overwhelming,254 so that the court must
rely on the DoJ to process and sublime those comments.255 Furthermore, the court is
ordinarily constrained both in its capacity to appreciate the significance of those
comments, and its ability to reformulate and propose a concrete alternative to the decree
under review. Thus, ordinarily negotiated decrees pursuant to the Tunney Act are
reviewed under a fairly loose and deferential standard, whereby the decree is approved if
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15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h).
15 U.S.C. § 16(e).
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United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 325 (D.D.C. 1995) (in evaluating initial DoJ
consent decree with Microsoft judge received only five largely unilluminating submissions).
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United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 200 (D.D.C. 2002) (in the final Microsoft
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it was negotiated bona fide (in the absence of improper influences) and is within the
realm of the public interest.256
(c) The European Commission remedy
The goal of European Commission's remedy in its Microsoft decision was to
promote Microsoft's collaboration with rival suppliers in related markets, while neither
preventing Microsoft from integrating forward into those products nor chilling the
innovation incentives for all industry participants.257 In light of the complaints by workgroup server producers, the Commission mandated Microsoft's continued cooperation
with firms that produce work-group servers in the following terms:
The natural remedy to Microsoft's abusive refusal to supply
is an order to supply what has been refused.
...
Microsoft should be ordered to disclose complete and
accurate specifications for the protocols used by Windows
work group servers in order to provide file, print and group
and user administration services to Windows work group
networks.258
On the surface at least, the Commission's injunction that Microsoft must supply
all the information necessary for the interoperability of Windows with non-Microsoft
work group servers seems to be a standard conduct remedy. However, as the
Commission recognized in its decision,259 the seemingly simple injunction generates
numerous further questions: about the nature and scope of the information that was to be
disclosed, about ensuring that such disclosure is timely, as well as setting the terms of
that disclosure so that they are neither unreasonably burdensome nor discriminatory.260
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Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 56 F.3d 1448, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See also United States v.
Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715-16 (D. Mass. 1975) (the Tunney Act is a check on the government's
good faith in settling the case, although the court does not determine if the settlement is the best that could
be obtained).
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See section IV.C.2.
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Microsoft EU ¶¶998-999.
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Microsoft EU ¶¶1000, 1005-1006.
260
The uncertain scope of the duty imposed on Microsoft is confirmed by recent events associated
with implementing the European decree. The first report from the Microsoft Monitoring Trustee found
initial disclosures by Microsoft to be so inadequate, that a programmer or team would be "wholly and
completely unable to proceed on the basis of the documentation." Microsoft's initial response was that the
European Commission required more than was set out in the decree, although subsequently offered to "go
beyond the 2004 Decision and offer a license to the source code" of the Windows system, a proposal which
met with mixed reactions from both within the Commission and Microsoft's competitors. See Microsoft
Offers to Open Windows Code, But European Commission, Critics Doubtful, 71 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1755, at 358 (Feb. 3, 2006).
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The Commission's decision provides no detailed or exhaustive rules that govern such
questions, identifying instead, in fairly broad terms, the objectives of the remedy.261 In a
manner similar to the U.S. decrees, the Commission relegated the detail to a monitoring
mechanism established by the decree, in order to supervise Microsoft's compliance
conduct:262
The effective monitoring of Microsoft's compliance with
this Decision will therefore have to be ensured by
establishing a suitable monitoring regime including a
monitoring trustee. Microsoft will have to submit a
proposal to that effect. Guiding principles for Microsoft in
this respect are outlined in the following.
The primary responsibility of the Monitoring Trustee
should be to issue opinions, upon application by a third
party or by the Commission or sua sponte¸ on whether
Microsoft has, in a specific instance, failed to comply with
this Decision, or on any issue that may be of interest with
respect to the effective enforcement of this Decision.263
The monitoring trustee was selected by the Commission from a list of experts provided
by Microsoft,264 and the remedy mandated that the trustee be given access to Microsoft
employees, premises and the source code. The decree also permits the trustee to
occasionally call upon other experts, to assist the trustee with discreteand precisely
defined tasks.265

(3) Evaluating remedial architectures
Judge Kollar-Kottelly's decision that rejected the non-settling states' proposal, and
a comparison of the proposals of the DoJ, the non-settling states and the European
261

Microsoft EU ¶1003 ("The objective of this Decision is to ensure that Microsoft's competitors can
develop products that interoperate with the Windows domain architecture natively supported in the
dominant Windows client PC operating system and hence viably compete with Microsoft's work group
server operating system."); ¶1006 (to promote "the objective of ensuring that competition in the common
market is not distorted") (quotations omitted).
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Note that the notion of "compliance" in this context is quite peculiar, in the sense that the
Commission's decision did not specify what level of cooperation Microsoft needed to maintain with its
rivals in this sector (there are no rules specifying the protocols or elements of code that Microsoft must
make available). Instead, the obligation on Microsoft is to supply adequate levels of interoperability
information and the definition of what level of cooperation is adequate is part and parcel of the process of
implementation rather than being determined ex ante.
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Microsoft EU ¶¶1044-1045 (footnote omitted).
264
The Commission appointed Professor Neil Barrett (a cybercrime expert) as the monitoring trustee
on October 5, 2005. See http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2005/2005083.htm (last visited on February
27, 2006).
265
Microsoft EU ¶1048.

ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE

67

Commission, demonstrate three principal controversies about the institutional
architecture of these antitrust remedial mechanisms. First, while all of the remedial
decrees removed the direct responsibility for on-going monitoring, supervision and
decision-makingfrom the courts and agencies, the proposed monitoring arrangements
differed in important respects. The DoJ decree opted for a more diffuse monitoring
mechanism, including the technical committee, the internal unit within Microsoftand the
joint DoJ-Microsoft reporting. By contrast, both the non-settling states' proposal and the
European Commission opted for a single monitor (the special master and the monitoring
trustee) with wide-ranging powers and responsibilities. The states also relied on an
internal mechanism implemented through Microsoft's corporate governance structure: an
independent internal monitor responsible to a special committee of independent directors.
The second key controversy relates to the rightsof access to the remedial mechanisms by
third parties— namely, entities apart from the agencies responsible for the antitrust
prosecution. The non-settling states and the European Commission opted to give third
parties right of access in addition to the monitor's right to initiate their own
investigations, while the DoJ decree limited the right of access to the remedial
mechanism to parties of the litigation only.266 Finally, the key substantivepoint of
divergence of the remedial duties was the extent to which the different decrees included
forward looking provisions, to cover products or technologies that were not central to the
findings of antitrust violation. This issue was important in light of the fast changing
environment in which different technologies can become superceded in short periods of
time.
In order to evaluate the above questions of institutional design, it is necessary to
examine the role these mechanisms play in promoting either the efficacy of the antitrust
remedial mechanisms in achieving the objectives of the antitrust intervention or the
accountability of the implementing bodies (to ensure thatthe remedy advances the public
interest, rather than, for example, being captured by the interestsof the regulated entity).
Within a standard hierarchical mechanism, both efficacy and accountability are assured
through the generation of top-down rules thatbreak down the overarching goal of the
principal into specific tasks. If well formulated, following such rules ensures both the
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According to the District Court opinion, the plaintiff states were themselves responsible to receive
complaints from third parties, assess those complaints and ultimately to decide whether they merit to be
brought to the mechanism put in place by the decree. New York v. Microsoft, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
Furthermore, the Court directed the states to form a committee which would coordinate their enforcement
efforts, so as to eliminate duplication of enforcement activities and ease the burden on both Microsoft and
the court. Id. at 182.
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effective pursuit of the desired goal, and the accountability of thoseresponsible for
implementation.
In the hierarchical paradigm, a remedial decree can be conceptualized as a
contract of a principal-agent variety, where a principal (the antitrust authority or court) is
providing a binding contract to the agent (the regulated entity), which the entity must
accept. If the principal is sufficiently well-informed about the world and about the agent,
she both knows the goals she is trying to pursue through the forcing contract, and (more
importantly) she can translate those goals into specific rules of conduct for the regulated
entity. Further, the all-knowing principal observes the actions of the agent — in which
case the remedial process becomes a relatively easy task. The principal can both specify
rules of conduct and observe the regulated entity's actions in order to determine the
degree of compliance. I n this scenario the monitoring process serves the relatively limited
function of checking compliance vis-à-vis clearly specified rules.
In the context of the antitrust remedial decree, as in many other regulatory
settings, the decision-maker (particularly the antitrust court, but also the antitrust
agencies) satisfies virtually none of the conditions to be an all- knowing principal. The
decision-makers have a general idea of the goals they wish to pursue - such as advancing
the public interest, restoring competition or eliminating any distortions to competition,
advancing innovation, preventing the exploitation of consumers, to name just a few
possible formulations. The principals are also substantially less informed about the detail
of the operations and capabilities of the agent necessary to answerquestions , such as
whether separating (or uncommingling) the code so as to provide Windows operating
system separately from the browser or the media player is feasible, whether the release of
interoperability information to competitors risks undermining the security or exclusivity
of the operating system source code and so on. Furthermore, the decision-maker cannot
observe all the actions of the agent to determine compliance, makingit difficult both to
write the contract and to monitor compliance. The problem is compounded by the fact
that both the principal and the regulated entity are to some degree imperfectly informed
about the current state of the world, and have far from perfect foresight about ways in
which market conditions will change in the future (although, again, the regulator is at an
informational disadvantage).
Given those conditions, the monitoring system is more appropriately
characterized as a learning mechanism. Even if the principal is fully informed about the
goals she is trying to pursue, she wouldstill need to know what actions by the agent are
feasible in pursuit of those goals and to call upon some body with greater local
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expertise267 to evaluate claims of feasibility or determine the level of implementation.
The monitoring agent aids the principal precisely by providing greater access to local
expertise about the activities of the scrutinized entity.
However, the injection of the monitoring agent, as an additional chain in the
remedial mechanism, creates another form of agency relationship. Ideally, monitoring
agents advances the goals of the principal, but the incentives of the principal and the
monitoring agent are not necessarily aligned. Thus, the institutional design should ensure
that the monitoring agent is properly accountable. Furthermore, while the monitoring
agent should have a greater degree of local expertise than the principal, to be able to
better evaluate and respond to claims and conductby the regulated entity and others in
the industry, the monitor still does not have perfect knowledge. For instance, the monitor
would still suffer from the limits of bounded rationality and the problems of hidden
action and asymmetric information vis-à-vis the regulated entity. Successful monitoring
mechanism design relaxes these constraints, so that the monitor can also access the local
knowledge only available to market participants. The mechanism should provide
incentives for the regulated entity itself to volunteer relevant information. This helps
both to monitor the compliance with the current set of rules, but also helps the principal
learn about the market, adjust the rules, or even the goals of the intervention. With this as
the background, we return to the three controversies identified earlier.
(a) Who should monitor?
The design of the monitoring mechanism involves decisions about (i) the make-up
of the monitoring body (whether it should be composed of one person or a committee);
(ii) the allocation of responsibilities to the monitor (whether the monitoring body can
initiate investigations, carry out those investigations, obtain external assistance, mediate
or arbitrate the issues that come before it); and (iii) the nature of the relationship between
the monitoring body and the regulated entity (whether the monitoring body can make
binding orders about the resolution of disputes or impose punitive measures).
The non-settling states proposal, likethe European remedy, would entrust
extensive responsibilities in a single special master. In the states' proposal, the special
master was given a general obligation to take all actions necessary or proper for "the
efficient performance of the special master's duties."268 The special master was obliged to
receive third party complaints, evaluate those complaints, carry out an investigation if
267

Local expertise refers to expertise or knowledge which is close to the every day operations of the
regulated entity.
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New York v. Microsoft, 224 F. Supp 2d 76, 180.

ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE

70

one is warranted, hear argument based on documentation and propose factual findings
and an order to the court, or alternatively to act as a mediator.269 All these obligations
were to be performed by the special master within "stringent time schedules."270
The district court rejected all aspects of the states' proposal for a special master as
a scheme that "would [not] prove to be workable in practice," since it placed the special
master in the role of detective, prosecutor and judge (as well as mediator).271 While this
language to some extent reveals the extent to which judges are steeped in the law
enforcement paradigm of antitrust, there is clearly a tension in placing both hierarchical
and problem-solving powers in the same person, which would place limits on the
relationship between the monitoring body and the regulated entity, as well as the extent to
which the two will be able to engage in free exchange of relevant information.272 In light
of the basic limits of human cognition and capacity, the Court criticized the special
master proposal as a "panacea." No matter how capable and knowledgeable the person in
the position of special master, there would be limits on her capacity to process all
relevant information, to appreciate the significance of complaints from industry, to devise
proposed solutions and to do so in a timely manner.
Quite apart from doubts about the effectiveness of this mechanism in promoting
the goals of the intervention, placing all monitoring responsibilities in the hands of an allpowerful master or trustee raises significant accountability concerns. As already pointed
out, once the monitoring arrangement is in place, the interests of theprincipal decision maker—court or authority—that grants the mandate and those of the monitoring agent are
not necessarily aligned. Furthermore, the starting assumption was that, while both the
269
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For example, Microsoft's level of cooperation with the technical committee from the DoJ decree as
compared with the monitoring trustee in the E.U. is likely explained by the different functions of these
bodies and their relationship vis-à-vis Microsoft. The E.U. Monitoring Trustee evaluates Microsoft's
actions to comply with the decree requirements, and in response to insufficient compliance the Commission
has threatened additional fines (while both the European Commission and Microsoft are also mindful of the
court review to which the Commission's decision and remedy are about to be subjected). In the DoJ
remedy, the Technical Committee submits technical documentation issues to Microsoft, and the timeliness
of responses is measured by specifically established Service Level Guidelines. Until late 2005, the joint
status reports were showing that Microsoft was meeting the guidelines nearly 100% of the time. Since
November 2005, both Microsoft and the Plaintiffs acknowledged that Microsoft had started to fall
significantly behind, and proposed to the Court that Microsoft file monthly reports on its cooperation with
prototype projects run by the Technical Committee. Even where problems arise, Microsoft staff have
worked with Technical Committee staff in order to develop improvised solutions that would ensure that
data collection and testing is not delayed. In their filing from Jan. 23, 2006 the Plaintiff authorities
comment that "[b]y the time of the next Joint Status Report, we should have a clearer picture of whether the
improvised solution has worked." Microsoft: The case that won't quit - Deadlines Slip, "mistakes" are
made, FTC:Watch No. 668, at 11-12 (Jan. 30, 2006).
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principal and the monitor have imperfect knowledge, the principal has less knowledge.
This is why the principal relies on the monitoring agent to assist in implementing the
decree. Since, in both the non-settling states proposal and in the European remedy, the
monitor is given a broad mandate, and is not specifically hemmed in by a set of rules, it is
not clear how such an all powerful trustee is held accountable and by which body. There
is no mechanism in these proposals that guarantees that the monitor would not be subject
to capture, or would not be self-aggrandizing or that she would not pursue her
professional, rather than the public, interest.
The only proposal of the non-settling states accepted by the district court was to
appoint an internal compliance officer within Microsoft by a committee of independent
directors, who is given considerable autonomy in monitoring activities within the
company. The rationale for such a proposal is to inject considerations relevant to
antitrust compliance into the highest levels of strategic thinking within the corporation.273
However, in light of the growing recognition of the weaknesses of existing forms of
corporate oversight, there are reasons to doubt that the corporate governance route
provides an effective response to the monitoring problem. After all, because directors
rely almost entirely on information from the agents whom they are supposed to govern
and monitor, they are victims to the selective and opportunistic presentation of
information. This would also be the case for a semi-autonomous compliance inspector
answerable only to independent directors and existing ostensibly outside the structure of
the company's regular operations.274
This discussion demonstrates the merit of relying upon a number of separate
channels for monitoring and implementation adopted in the negotiated decree by the DoJ.
For instance the peer-evaluation channel, through the technical committee, can, on an ongoing basis, tap into on-the-ground expertise in order to assessthe significance of claims
and disputes that arise between the regulated entity, other firms in the market or the
antitrust agencies. The reporting channel (performed jointly byMicrosoft and the DoJ)
provides for public evaluation of the implementation of the decree, which promotes
learning by all who are involved in the process (including other firms). This creates
opportunities for adjustment of regulatory and business strategy. For example, Microsoft
273

Such a proposition seems particularly apposite, given Farrell and Weiser's argument that in some
instances the platform monopolist acts in ways that are not necessarily consistent with its own medium to
long term self-interest. Injecting the antitrust perspective (including promoting collaborative relationships
and promoting an innovative downstream market structure) at the strategic level may be an occasion to
disrupt and reflect upon a proposed course of action consistent with such a perspective, revealing effects or
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and the DoJ have jointly proposed adjustment of some of the strategies pursued where
they were not achieving the goals of the decree.275 The learning by the principal (the DoJ)
about the market, through direct engagement with Microsoft in drawing up the joint
reports, is in itselfa n accountability check on the technical committee. Further, if the
remedy persistently fails in promoting the desired goals, such engagement gives the DoJ
a better appreciation for the need of further action and the kinds of action that might be
feasible. Finally, the possibility for the court's jurisdiction to be re-engaged, possibly with
more blunt and draconian solutions, provides not only a final instrument in the armory,
but an important background threat that provides incentives for the regulated entity to
cooperate and work within the remedial decree mechanism.276
(b) The role of third parties in the remedial process
Expanding rights of participation within the remedy mechanism can improve both
its efficacy and accountability. Both the U.S. litigation and the decision of the European
Commission thatled to the above remedies arose from government prosecution efforts
under the respective antitrust laws of the two jurisdictions. As such, it was only
Microsoft and the prosecuting government agencies that were direct parties to the
disputes. However, those government efforts were generated and informed by
complaints from firms who were either subject to the restrictive practices employed by
Microsoft, or the targets of such practices. In the United States, the government litigation
ran parallel with a number of private suits against Microsoft by its rivals, such as
Netscape, Sun Microsystems and others.
The ability of third parties to have a direct "voice in this process"277 enables the
monitoring mechanism to tap into the local knowledge of participants in the industry, to
understand their concerns and to learn about technological capabilities of different
solutions based on benchmarking with solutions of other firms. This strengthens the
monitor's ability to assess the actions, claims and capabilities of Microsoft. Judge KollarKottelly acknowledged that "very often such third parties will be most immediately
aware of Microsoft's conduct."278 If modern antitrust remedies are to resolve governance
problems in the context of innovative collaborations, it is third party firms thatare most
immediately affected by such conduct. Consistent pressure from third party submissions
275
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to the monitoring and remedial bodies (whether from software developers, equipment
manufacturers, final consumers, or academics) also enhances the accountability of the
monitors. To the extent that the monitoring agent is primarily reactive to third party
complaints, such direct participation prevents them from shirking, or getting captured or
self-aggrandizing.
In light of the potential benefits of broader participation outlined above, the
District Court's refusal to allow third parties to directly participate in the implementation
mechanism is puzzling.279 The Court's justification that the plaintiff-states themselves
should "assess the assertions of such third parties for merit" and bring such complaints to
the remedial mechanism for resolution is not very satisfactory.280 After all, the fact that
the government authorities call upon the services of aseparate monitoring body, and rely
on third party complaints, is essentially, an admission of their inability to guide the
implementation process themselves. This may be due to their ability to assess the merits
of certain complaints or out of fear that they may be subject to capture or the selective
presentation of information. Given the court's insistence that the antitrust authorities
should act as an additional filter to third party complaints, the limitations of those
authorities' will constrain the efficacy of the remedial mechanism.
(c) Forward-looking mechanisms
In asking for an alternative substantive remedy, the non-settling states' key
argument was that the terms of the DoJ decree did not go far enough to guarantee the
restoration of competitive conditions in the market. The states had three specific
concerns. First, they claimed that the decree narrowly defined the middleware
applications to which it was principally addressed, and did not cover a sufficient range of
applications that could pose a threat to the Windows operating system monopoly,
particularly in light of the dynamism of the market and the changes that had already taken
place since the litigation was commenced. For example, even before the litigation was
concluded, Microsoft had stopped engaging in many of the restrictive practices impugned
by the original DoJ complaint.281 Similarly, by the time the remedy was implemented,
applications such as the Netscape browser were no longer viable competitors. Second,
the states argued that the DoJ decree did not provide sufficient levels of disclosure by
Microsoft of the information necessary for developers to write applications that would
communicate with the Windows system and effectively compete with Microsoft's own
279
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applications (a similar concern was the basis of the European case). Finally, the nonsettling states also argued that limiting the term of the decree to only five years was
insufficient.
The DistrictCourt rejected all of the above suggestions for expanding the scope
of the decree so as to make it forward looking. The court's opinion did not analyze the
substantive reasons offered for an extended scope. Instead, the court emphasized that the
remedial mechanism was primarily a compliance mechanism, which meant that its
provisions had to be limited by the practices identified in the original complaint and
found to be illegal by the D.C. Circuit. While recognizing that it had the power to
implement a remedy with much broader scope, the Court viewed an extension of either
the time or the scope of the decree as illegitimate:282 " This suit, however remarkable, is
not the vehicle through which Plaintiffs can resolve all existing allegations of
anticompetitive conduct which have not been proven or for which liability has not been
ascribed."283 Commenting on the terms of the decree, Judge Kollar-Kottelly went on to
observe that "the Court has taken great care to provide the parties with a decree which is
unambiguous in its terms so as to ensure that Microsoft's compliance is readily
achieved."284
Such a characterization of the remedial mechanism is inadequate for at least three
reasons. First, given the scope and the breadth of the Microsoft litigation (with a number
of iterations through government prosecutions in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere, many
private suits, and unsuccessful attempts to formulate an acceptable and effective remedy),
it is very unlikely that an effective final remedy could be in the form of a decree entirely
free from ambiguity in its terms. The key reason for the complexity of the litigation was
the profusion of ambiguity — about the nature of the competitive interactions in the
market, the ultimate effects of the impugned conduct, as well as the outcomes of any
remedial efforts implemented. Given this background, if the final decree was
"unambiguous in its terms," this could only be either because Microsoft had already
stopped to engage in the practices covered by the decree, or alternatively because the
decree was so narrow in its scope that market developments had made it irrelevant.
Furthermore, it is clear that Microsoft and the DoJ did not view the decree as being
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water-tight, since the joint reporting mechanism provides scope for exploring different
strategies to advance the goals of the decree.
Secondly, as a matter of legal principle, there was no reason why the terms of the
final decree should be tightly hemmed in by the judicial findings of violation.285 After
all, no criminal sanctions or fines were imposed on Microsoft or Microsoft officers in the
U.S. litigation. The court did not award damages, nor was the most drastic of measures,
the break-up of the company, ultimately considered or adopted. Had those standard
antitrust remedies been sought or imposed, the case for limiting the remedy to the
findings of liability would have been stronger — either because of concerns about
fairness, or because of the need to tailor and quantify monetary or structural remedies. In
fact, the main advantage of the diffuse remedial architecture established in the decree,
with opportunities for the parties to learn and adjust strategy mid-course, is precisely to
avoid difficult ex anteline- drawing in circumstances where the future of the market is
difficult to predict. If similar questions arose in the future, with similar underlying
problems about mediating cooperation and competition, there is no reason not to resolve
those problems within the same mechanism that resulted from the original litigation.
This seems preferable from the perspective of every party involved, compared to the
alternative of re-engaging the cumbersome, lengthy and expensive apparatus of another
antitrust litigation.
Thirdly, as the District Court recognized, the remedial mechanism established by
the decree was, to a large extent, an alternative forum for dispute resolution between
Microsoft and firms that operate in markets related to the Windows operating system.286
This view is uncontroversial in light of the inherently collaborative nature of inter-firm
relationships in this industry and the dangers for collaboration break-down outlined
earlier.287 However, if the remedial mechanism is to be a forum for resolution of future
disputes, it is difficult to view it as a classic compliance regime — particularly since in
these industries, the past is unlikely to repeat itself.
To make the same points in a different way, Microsoft’s aggressive practices
directed at Netscape or Java created disincentives for firms to cooperate with Microsoft
and innovate within its network, since Microsoft, as the owner of the platform standard,
could determine the dynamics of competition and innovation in the sector. The decree
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provided a framework for the re-building of collaborative relationships in the industry
which would benefit innovation.288 In this context collaboration does not mean simply
working together, which is essential in order for related products and services to
interoperate, but also engaging in the deep sharing of information necessary to produce
novel and robust solutions.289 The decree mechanism could give smaller innovators a
venue in which they can air their grievances to the extent that they believe that Microsoft
has appropriated the value of their joint collaborative investigation, or that its actions are
likely to harm the public interest in some other way. Such complaints are not guaranteed
to have merit, nor will they necessarily be heard. However, this process provides
opportunities for a more deliberate evaluation, even of their own interests, by Microsoft
and other firms in the industry. For the decree to perform this role, unlike ordinary
antitrust litigation, it does not create opportunistic incentives for disgruntled competitors
to sue for treble damages in hoping to exploit the sentiments of an uninformed jury or
judge or, alternatively to use such a threat as a tool to achieve a favorable settlement.
On this view, the antitrust decree could result in a forward looking governance
mechanism that would form the basis for an alternative regime of self-regulation of interfirm relationships in the industry. Not only is the availability of such a process beneficial
to all participants in the industry — including, we should emphasize, Microsoft as the
network owner — but the technical committee and the joint reporting process also
generate information and knowledge about the technology and inter-firm relationships
that can be used in either adjusting the decree290 or in a subsequent more ambitious
regulatory effort if this proves necessary.

E. Why antitrust?
It comes as no surprise that, as the structure of markets and inter-firm
relationships changes, so will the role of antitrust law. Thus, given the tendency towards
288
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networked forms of production among collaborating firms, the antitrust concern shifts
away from static efficiency towards the governance issues presented by innovative
collaborations, particularly because the other possible governance mechanisms cannot
fulfill that role. Yet this Article does not suggest that antitrust mechanisms are likely to
proliferate as an aid to inter-firm collaboration more broadly. Such a claim would be
both conceptually unappealing and practically unattainable in a market economy. In the
majority of cases, antitrust intervention is not likely to be necessary. Inter-firm
collaborative problem-solving is already prevalent as a mode of production and
innovation, and in most cases firms find ways to manage their cooperation effectively.
Those are caseswhere the intense mutual provision of information about designs and
capabilities, the uncertainty about the future environment and the potential gains from the
mutual exploration are a sufficient check on opportunistic conduct.291
Within the modes of production of the new economy, competition continues to
play a key moderating and disciplining function — as a spur for innovation, as an
incentive to find good collaborators and as a control on collaborator opportunism. For
instance, firms rely on benchmarking to identify the space of possibilities and to verify
the claims of the firm's collaborators, but this discipline depends on the availability of
solutions developed by other firms, not only those who are immediate competitors, but
also those facing similar design or production problems in other markets. Moreover, the
tendency towards flexible modes of production leads to an increased de-specification of
assets which reduces the opportunities for hold-up by collaborators:
[T]he master resource in the new system is the ability to redeploy resources fluidly. ... [T]he novel search routines and
problem solving disciplines help develop this flexibility by
breaking apart static procedures. Equally important is the
capacity to re-use a high ... percentage of capital equipment
committed to one project in subsequent ones ... The greater
a work team's command of the search routines, the problem
solving disciplines and the re-configuring of flexible
equipment, the more accomplished it becomes at redeploying any resource. The effect is that product-specific
resources are 'de-specified,' coming increasingly to
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resemble general purpose assets, and thus no longer the
instruments or object of hold-up.292
Despite the fact that certain mechanisms for controlling opportunism are inherent
in the modes of production, as this Article demonstrates, there remain situations in which
cooperation break-down (particularly in distributing the fruits of the joint collaboration)
can occur, and where the possibility of such break-down can act as an ex ante
disincentive to cooperate. Furthermore, none of the usual ex ante mechanisms, such as
contracts or property rights, provides a promising instrument for resolving or attenuating
the governance problem. Once disputes arise, the parties do invoke the antitrust laws as
an instrument for dispute resolution. A possible response of the antitrust authorities is to
treat this problem as being outside the antitrust purview, even though it affects the
competitive dynamics in the market, the rate of innovation and consumer welfare.
Alternatively, if the antitrust institutions decide to intervene, any intervention — even a
seemingly simple duty to provide sufficient interoperability information — requires a
mechanism to oversee the implementation, and even more importantlyto determine the
content of the duty (what is "sufficient interoperability information"). The threat of
damages is a clumsy deterrence mechanism, since both sides can have legitimate (or nonopportunistic) reasons for ending the collaboration. Therefore, the danger of an award of
damages ex post only deters, rather than promoting collaboration.
Many of the antitrust cases discussed in the Article arise in contexts where for a
given reason, such as strong network effects, increasing returns to scale, or in a quasiregulated setting, a firm has an overwhelming share of the market in a product which
becomes a platform to which other firms must adjust their own products. For that reason
alone, some degree of cooperation becomes inevitable in those settings. The control over
the platform product gives the firm the power to act opportunistically in negotiations with
its collaborators, including a disproportionate ability to appropriate the results of the joint
exploration (either directly or through integrating vertically) and to inhibit the innovation
efforts of its rivals. Somewhat surprisingly, the dominant firm may do so even in
situations where integration would not serve its own interest, properly defined.
Therefore, the availability of ex post antitrust governance mechanisms can provide a
credible instrument to "ty[e] the king's hands"293 - enabling a dominant firm to garner the
diversity of collaborators in problem-solving innovation in a way that helps it advance its
own self-interest.
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The remedial solutions that have emerged are more closely tailored to the
problems that beset these relationships. In accordance with the modern principles of
organizational success, the antitrust governance mechanisms are not hierarchical - they
aim to generate knowledge and encourage cooperation by preventing unthinking and
opportunistic reliance on self-help strategies.294 Precisely for this reason, these
mechanisms are preferable to the many alternative proposals for new administrative or
legislative tools to cope with the antitrust challenges presented by the transformation in
the nature of productive relationships in the new economy.
The enactment of the National Cooperative Research Act ("NCRA") was the first,
although very partial, legislative measure that attempted to deal with the disjuncture
between the classic concerns and remedies of antitrust law and the need for and the
profusion of deeply intimate collaborations among modern firms.295 The key reform
introduced by this Act was to reaffirm that collaborative research ventures were not per
se illegal under the antitrust laws, and instead scrutinized under the rule of reason.296 In a
number of contributions, Jorde and Teece criticized the NCRA reforms as insufficient for
two reasons.297 First, in their view the uncertainty of the contentand applicatio n of the
rule of reason was a continuing disincentive for collaborative innovation. Secondly, they
argued that the NCRA was drafted on the erroneous premise that innovation was a serial
process which began with research and ended with production, instead of the on-going
iterative and recursive process described earlier in this Article. Jorde and Teece proposed
that the safe harbors in the NCRA be extended not only to jointresearch, but to all
collaborations involving innovative joint production, commercialization and distribution.
Further, in order to ensure that such joint arrangements were not used as a cover for
collusive behavior, Jorde and Teece proposed transferring responsibility for antitrust
review from the courts to the agencies. Namely, the parties of a proposed collaborative
venture could notify the venture to the antitrust agencies, and the agencies would vet the
proposal and provide antitrust clearance for those ventures that do not raise
anticompetitive concerns.298
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While the above proposals have been partially implemented,299 they are
insufficiently sensitive to the limitations of a system of notification and clearance both
generally, but especially in highly dynamic contexts. Such a regime places an enormous
administrative burden on the agency to make an ex ante judgment about the likely
competitive effects of collaborative ventures based on a voluminous record of documents,
before the venture has even commenced its activities. The Jorde and Teece proposal did
not provide any mechanisms through which the agencies would overcome the limits in
their own capacity, in order to gain knowledge about the relevant market.300
In a world in which collaborative inter-firm relationships are widespread, a
regime for administrative notification and clearance must be either perfunctory or entirely
meaningless. The purpose of the new collaborations is not to implement a particular joint
plan, but instead to jointly learn about the world which is dynamic and unpredictable. In
light of that purpose, the antitrust agencies are simply not capable of making ex ante
predictions about the competitive significance of an arrangement without actually
monitoring its implementation. Apart from the fact that such a regime does not
effectively guard against possible collusive arrangements, the clearance procedure only
protects the collaborating parties from opportunistic use of the antitrust laws by
competitors (or consumer plaintiffs) outside the venture. However, as described earlier in
this Article, the disputes leading to innovation bottlenecks can arise due to opportunistic
conduct within collaborative relationships and out of attempts to exploit other
collaborators. This is a problem for which the clearance regime offers no solution.
Furthermore, the technological complexity of new economy markets creates novel
opportunities for collusive arrangements, while making it increasingly difficult for the
antitrust authorities to appreciate and detect them,301 unless they have ways of monitoring
and learning about new technologies and market relationships.
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New legislation is also unlikely to address these governance problems adequately
and timely. For example, some have argued that in preference to ad hoc dilution of
intellectual property rights by antitrust courts, legislatures are better situated to
implement detailed statutoryaccess regimes that regulate the conduct of the owner of a
bottleneck in production and innovation, should they deem that the public interest is
sufficiently engaged.302 However, for a statutory regime to be enacted, the particular
problem must be sufficiently salient to attract legislative attention. The legislative
machinery operates slowly and the point at which legislative intervention is needed is not
always apparent. Even for problems which are sufficiently salient,303 legislative solutions
are by definition ex cathedra and difficult to alter. In a dynamic market environment,
detailed and specific statutory schemes would tend to be too rigid and become obsolete
relatively quickly. Yet a broadly worded statute would need to rely on the courts or some
other mechanism for interpretation and implementation.304
The antitrust remedies described earlier are preferable to comprehensive
legislative solutions for at least two reasons. The flexible remedy implemented through
an antitrust intervention, which leaves a high degree of autonomy on the regulated
entities and provides mechanisms for on-going adaptation, can be a first step towards
identifying both the extent of the problem and the range of possible and appropriate
responses. If developments in the industry or technology circumvent the bottleneck
problem, the antitrust remedy can be easily terminated. Further, if the problem persists,
the antitrust remedy is a mechanism for resolving disputes and generating information
that builds capacity to develop a more fully fledged regulatory effort by Congress, should
that become necessary.

VI. Conclusion
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In a recent article comparing the evolution of U.S. and European antitrust law,
John Vickers has argued that antitrust can develop into either a form based or an
economics based law. He proceeds to endorse the latter as a sounder basis for future
evolution and elaboration of European competition law.305 In his view, form based
antitrust law aims to develop rules that describe the kinds of conduct that business firms
should avoid.306 By contrast, economics based evolution would allow the law to distill
underlying principles with reference to actual or potential economic effects. According
to Vickers, economics based evolution is preferred because this approach aligns
competition law with its economic purposes and contributes towards making the law
internally consistent.
Yet Vickers’ distinction between form and economics based law may not be as
simple nor withstand further scrutiny, unless it is linked to a further claim about
institutional responsibilities for decision-making and mechanisms for knowledge
acquisition. If economic analysis could supply ex ante efficiency-based rules to isolate
conduct likely to be harmful, then this would be nothing but a description of the types of
conduct that firms must avoid, eliminating any difference between form and economicsbased evolution.307 If the distinction is to hold, therefore, Vickers must be envisaging
largely ex post analysis of the actual or potential effects of impugned business conduct,
presumably through extensive involvement of economic experts.
However, in the U.S. at least, the courts did not whole-heartedly embrace such a
project. While the Chicago era focus on efficiency may have been appropriate for the
Chandlerian production landscape, the courts are not institutionally well-suited either to
promote efficiency or to arbitrate expert disputes. Instead, they have invoked formalist
legal screens to limit ex post admission of factual and expert evidence in antitrust
disputes, even if the doctrinally supple rule of reason allowed (or encouraged) it.308 On
the one hand, the generation of economic knowledge occurs in one space, often in a
conflicting and evolutionary manner. On the other hand, this knowledge was translated
into economic precedents that satisfy the requirements and limitations of the judiciary.
Such precedent, once encrusted, discourages the questioning of even erroneous
principles, or presumptions arising out of ideological habits.
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More importantly, as firms and markets have changed, the static allocative
efficiency paradigm is less relevant to the new antitrust regime. Post-Chandlerian market
relationships are characterized by vertically disaggregated, federated and networked
firms. Underlying market conditions change rapidly, so innovation is an essential aspect
of success and often takes the form of routine problem-solving and re-application of
existing knowledge to novel contexts. Collaboration is endemic, as a way of disrupting
organizational routine and generating otherwise inaccessible information necessary to
formulate, evaluate and adjust novel designs. In this environment, collaboration with
customers, vertically related firms, but also current or former horizontal competitors is
not merely an aspiration, but an empirical fact. Such changes in the nature of the firm
lead to novel problems of managing joint co-development and complex strategic
interactions in a dynamic world.
Therefore, contemporary antitrust interventions focus on regulating the forms of
inter-firm cooperation indispensable to innovation, a problem which antitrust law
traditionally disclaimed309 and yet one that cannot be resolved through alternative
governance mechanisms such as contract or property. Since it cannot rely on the
traditional deterrence model, the new antitrust policy is more ambitious, and must
overcome the limits of the standard decision-making mechanisms. Thus, this Article
considers a third alternative, of an institutions-based elaboration of antitrust law,310 which
Vickers’ apparently exhaustive covering of the field does not contemplate. The new
competition policy is based on designing remedies that resolve concrete problems in
inter-firm relationships. Such an antitrust policy is more attuned to the nature of
relationships and interaction among firms – it is neither inherently suspicious of firm
action and inter-firm collaboration, nor rooted in the belief that the market is
presumptively efficient and self-correcting. As a result, in its new phase antitrust is less
abstemious and self-abnegating compared to its recent past, yet it is not the activist
enforcer of democratic values of an earlier era. The inspiration for these proposals, as is
often the case, comes from actual practice – the emergence of non-hierarchical remedial
decrees that generate knowledge in order to adjust to a dynamic environment, in which
the courts merely support an emergent regulatory regime. The Article identifies criteria
for evaluating those mechanisms in order to understand when and how they may be
useful and to stimulate further thinking about improving their design.
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